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“The more strictly we are watched, the better we behave.”  
-Jeremy Bentham1 
 INTRODUCTION 
“To require disclosure or not to require disclosure?” That is the 
question faced by regulators, including the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC),2 in light of the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in 
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 1.  Jeremy Bentham, Farming Defended, in 1 WRITINGS ON THE POOR LAWS 276–77 
(Michael Quinn ed., Oxford University Press 2001) (1796).  
 2.  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political 
Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 966 (2011). 
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Citizens United v. FEC,3 which allowed for a new free flow of 
corporate money into the American political system.4 Since 2011, a 
petition by ten law professors asking for transparency of corporate 
political spending has been pending before the SEC.5 Over one 
million people have written to the SEC asking the Commission to act 
on this petition.6 
The political spending of publicly traded corporations is 
significant for two reasons: (1) public corporations tend to be larger, 
affording them greater potential influence over the political process, 
and (2) they tend to have more shareholders whose interests will be 
implicated by campaign spending. Here, “political spending” is meant 
to encompass all spending in the electoral process, whether directly or 
indirectly, and not, unless otherwise noted, disclosure of lobbying 
expenses. This article anticipates the SEC’s eventual promulgation of 
rules requiring disclosure of corporate political spending.7 Many of 
the core questions that we can now study about the market’s reaction 
to increased regulation of listed companies are likely to be implicated 
in the debate about corporate political spending disclosures. 
Corporations that do not want to disclose their political spending 
are likely to challenge any rule that the SEC issues on the subject.8 
 
 3.  Andrew Joseph, Poll: Most Voters Oppose Citizens United Decision, NAT. J. BLOG 
(Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/blogs/influencealley/2012/01/poll-most-voters-
oppose-citizens-united-decision-20 (“The poll found that 62 percent of all voters oppose the 
Supreme Court's Citizens United decision (the two-year anniversary of which is tomorrow) and 
46 percent of voters strongly oppose it. Meanwhile, 55 percent of voters do not believe that 
corporations should have the same rights as people.”). 
 4.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010); Nell Minow, Editor & Co-Founder, 
The Corporate Library, The Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture to the SEC Historical Society 
(Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/ 
programs/sechistorical-podcast-031710-transcript.pdf.  
 5.  The ten professors are Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, Jr., 
James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Henry Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., 
Donald C. Langevoort, and Hillary Sale. Petition for Rulemaking from the Committee on 
Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending, to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n 1 (Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Disclosure Comm. Petition], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf). 
 6.  See Comments on Rulemaking Petition: Petition to Require Public Companies to 
Disclose to Shareholders the Use of Corporate Resources for Political Activities, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM. (2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4-637.shtml (last visited Aug. 22, 
2014). 
 7.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78q-1(b)(8) (West 2014) (authorizing the SEC to adopt “such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest, 
for the protection of investors”). 
 8.  Comment letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al., to Ms. Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-1198.pdf. 
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Such a legal challenge is destined to be heard by the D.C. Circuit, 
which examines many federal regulations with an increasingly 
jaundiced eye.9 This article addresses the hostility that the D.C. Circuit 
may harbor against a new SEC rule requiring greater corporate 
transparency in election activities and provides some data that might 
assist the SEC in navigating this gauntlet. 
Of late, the D.C. Circuit has stuck down new regulations on 
numerous grounds, including finding that the SEC did not do a 
sufficiently rigorous cost-benefit analysis, that the rule does not foster 
market efficiency, or that it somehow conflicts with the First 
Amendment.10 If the SEC promulgates a new rule on corporate 
political spending, then neither the SEC nor the D.C. Circuit will be 
writing on a blank slate;11 both will stake a position in a long-running 
debate over what types of regulations foster efficient markets.12 On 
 
 9.  John C. Coates, IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and 
Implications 26 (European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper No. 234/2014, 
2014) [hereinafter Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375396 (“In the seven years after Chamber 
of Commerce [v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005)], the D.C. Circuit handed down six more 
similar decisions, striking down a range of SEC actions, an average of one per year, representing 
one in seven of the SEC’s major rules over that period.”). 
 10.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(f) (West 2014) (requiring the SEC to “also consider, in addition to 
the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation”); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial 
Regulation 14 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 464, Dec. 24, 2013), available at 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/constitutional-
governance/files/cle_reading-_panel_4.pdf; see also Cass R. Sunstein, & Adrian Vermeule, 
Libertarian Administrative Law 1 (June 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2460822 (“In recent years, several judges on the nation’s most 
important regulatory court—the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit—have given birth to libertarian administrative law, in the form of a series of judge-made 
doctrines that are designed to protect private ordering from national regulatory intrusion.”).  
 11.  Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC 
Rulemaking, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 704 (2013) (noting that the “history of repeated 
invalidations of SEC rulemakings by the D.C. Circuit suggests some degree of distrust of the 
SEC’s policymaking judgments”); Richard D. Pomp, The Disclosure of State Corporate Income 
Tax Data: Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 373, 463 (1993) (“Most of 
the arguments against disclosure, similar to the arguments often raised against proposals that 
threaten the status quo, involve the incantation of threadbare and shopworn slogans.”). 
 12.  Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure as Catalysts for Political 
Change: The Choice between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (examining “the major philosophical schools, [tracing] the evolution in 
public policy, and [assessing] some of the principal costs and benefits of regulation and 
deregulation”); Robert W. Ingram & Eugene G. Chewning, The Effect of Financial Disclosure 
Regulation on Security Market Behavior, 58 ACCT. REV. 562, 563 (1983) (studying the various 
views on the disclosure and regulation debate, noting that the “arguments posited as 
justification for market regulation . . . include (1) the existence of inadequate incentives to 
disclose information, (2) unequal possession of information, and (3) motivation to suppress 
unfavorable information in an unregulated environment”); see also Raymond H. Brescia, Trust 
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one extreme, laissez-faire purists have argued that all regulations 
burden the invisible hand of the market13 and are particularly costly 
for smaller firms.14 The solution for a laissez-faire purist would be no 
regulation of business, not even modest disclosure requirements.15 But 
for others, timely, robust disclosures and other securities regulations 
are precisely the reason that the American securities markets are the 
market of choice for investors around the world.16 Regulation, in 
other words can, if properly designed, produce benefits in the form of 
 
in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and Financial Re-regulation, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1361 (2009) 
(finding generally, that smart regulation instills trustworthiness among investors and the public 
which would increase economic growth). 
 13.  E.g., ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 165 (6th ed. 1790) (“[The 
rich] are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, 
which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its 
inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the 
society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.”). 
 14.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 669, 687 (1984) (“Mandatory disclosure rules promulgated by the government are one 
means to achieve standardization, but it does not follow that mandatory disclosure is 
necessary.”). 
 15.  Lloyd L. Drury, III, Disclosure Is Speech: Imposing Meaningful First Amendment 
Constraints on SEC Regulatory Authority, 58 S.C. L. REV. 757, 759–60 (2007) (arguing that the 
role of the SEC in disclosure rulemaking should be limited because “economic research and 
related legal scholarship suggest that there is less need for the SEC to protect investors than 
exists in the case of normal consumer protection, where advertising enjoys full status as 
commercial speech”); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (arguing that “U.S. issuers have increasingly shunned public 
offerings in favor of private offerings to avoid the costs of mandatory disclosure and heightened 
liability”); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2375 (1998) (“It is difficult to prove what, if any item, among 
required disclosures is of less value to investors than items voluntarily disclosed, but the great 
variety in content across disclosure regimes—a recent study identified one hundred SEC 
disclosure items deemed excessive compared to international standards—suggests that a 
number of mandates are not cost effective.”). 
 16.  Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1200–07 (1999) (arguing in favor of stronger mandatory 
SEC disclosure rules in order to increase corporate social transparency); Jesse M. Fried, Firms 
Gone Dark, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 150, 152 (2009) (noting that “that public investors’ wealth 
increased substantially when firms were forced to enter the mandatory disclosure system”); 
Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 819 (2006) 
(arguing further that mandatory disclosure provides more benefits to investors because it 
“reduces search and information processing costs for investors by requiring cheap, readily 
available, standardized, and relatively reliable disclosure of information”); Edward Rock, 
Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 686 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he existing SEC disclosure system can be 
understood as . . . serv[ing] a standardization function, both with regard to form and quantity of 
disclosure, thereby aiding in the comprehension and comparison of different investment 
options. . . . Second, it provides a mechanism for the adjustment of reporting obligations over 
time. . . . Third, it provides a credible and specialized enforcement mechanism, which warrants 
both the comprehensiveness and quality of the information disclosed”).  
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lower costs of capital for companies.17 In brief, wise regulation fosters 
a market that is trustworthy and efficient.18 The goal is not regulation 
for its own sake, but rather to adopt an ideal level of regulation that 
provides investors with the optimal level of disclosures and 
protections at tolerable costs to reporting firms.19 
The question of whether a new SEC rule requiring political 
spending disclosures would be good for the markets is part of the 
larger debate over which types of disclosures and other securities 
regulations help rather than harm the market.20 This study considers 
two recently enacted major securities laws that took divergent 
approaches to regulation: (1) The Public Company Accounting 
Reform and Investor Protection Act, otherwise known as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), and (2) the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act (JOBS Act).21 This study then observes the market’s 
reaction based upon stock price movement to each law to test the 
 
 17.  Richard B. Freeman, Reforming the United States' Economic Model After the Failure of 
Unfettered Financial Capitalism, 85 CHI. KENT L. REV. 685, 695 (2010) (“The end result of the 
experiment in deregulation of finance was thus the opposite of what the aficionados of laissez 
faire intended. It created a finance sector and real economy more dependent on the government 
than before. It raised suspicions about competence and honesty not only in banking but in 
business in general.”); David Brodwin, The Good Side of Federal Regulations, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Mar. 8, 2012, 2:06 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-
intelligence/2012/03/08/the-good-side-of-federal-regulations (“As has been argued by leading 
business experts for years, thoughtful regulation can reduce waste, boost output, and even 
create jobs.”). 
 18.  Perry E. Wallace, Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities under the Securities Laws: 
The Potential of Securities-Market-Based Incentives for Pollution Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1093, 1129 (1993) (“By requiring disclosure and punishing disclosure violations and other 
securities-related wrongdoing, securities laws promote the public’s interest in the accuracy of 
securities prices and the general integrity of securities markets.”); Amy Deen Westbrook, 
Sunlight on Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality Excuse Incomplete Disclosure Under 
the Securities Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 13, 75 (2011) (“The U.S. federal securities laws have 
been held up as a model of disclosure-based regulation, of a flexible and effective way to 
discipline a market and protect investors.”). 
 19.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(f) (West 2014). 
 20.  Freeman, supra note 17, at 691 (“Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, warned that the lack of transparency, excess of leverage, and absence of 
sufficient prudential controls in over-the-counter derivatives posed a danger to U.S. financial 
markets.” (citing Brooksley Born, Chairperson, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
Remarks at Chicago Kent-IIT Commodities Law Institute: The Lessons of Long-Term Capital 
Management L.P. (Oct. 15, 1998), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/opaborn-
37.htm.)). 
 21.  Stacie K. Townsend, The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act Takes the Bite Out of 
Sarbanes-Oxley: Adding Corporate Governance to the Discussion, 99 IOWA L. REV. 893, 896 
(2014) (“[T]he general motivations behind SOX were investor protection and corporate 
governance. In 2012, following the recession caused by the global financial crisis, Congress 
passed the JOBS Act. Thus, Congress’s general motivation behind the JOBS Act was to spur 
economic activity.”). 
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broad question of whether the market prefers or opposes more 
disclosure. 
While there will be distinctions between some of the financial 
disclosures required by the above laws and those disclosures that 
would be contained in a new rule on political spending, we do not 
believe such distinctions are so significant as to derail a meaningful 
analysis. If the market has a positive reaction to increased financial 
disclosures or, conversely, a negative reaction to the relaxation of 
financial disclosures, then it would stand to reason that the market 
would have a similar reaction to disclosures of corporate political 
spending.22 
This article first discusses the lack of an SEC rule on corporate 
political spending and argues that such a rule is needed in light of the 
Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision. It then explains the D.C. 
Circuit’s requirements of a cost-benefit analysis during the rule 
making process for federal administrative agencies like the SEC.23 It 
introduces data on the market’s reaction to SOX and to the JOBS 
Act, which shows that the market reacted positively to SOX and 
negatively to the JOBS Act.24 In short, the data demonstrates that the 
market values transparency and distrusts opaqueness.25 The D.C. 
 
 22.  See Gary F. Goldring, Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Projections and the Goals of 
Securities Regulation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1525, 1528–29 (1981) (“Corporate disclosure . . . 
improves informational efficiency because investors and the general market have more relevant 
information to incorporate into security prices. This, in turn, increases allocational efficiency.”). 
 23.  Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(“Without such a cost-benefit analysis, accounting for benefits as well as costs, we do not 
understand how the remainder of the agency’s explanation, all of which focuses solely on the 
costs of the rule, could pass muster in this court on petition for review.”). 
 24.  Additionally, in the case of SOX, the increase in market value for a median S&P 500 
firm is about 80 times the increase in auditing expenses, the most cited costs of implementing 
the new disclosure rules. See Kathy Fogel, Rwan El-Khatib, Nancy Chun Feng, & Ciara Torres-
Spelliscy, The Market Reaction to Disclosure Rules, RES. ACCT. REG. (under review). 
 25.  To test the robustness of our findings, we included three variables that reflect the 
strength of corporate governance in the regressions. The first variable was a dummy that sets to 
one if the majority of the firm’s directors satisfies the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or 
NASDAQ listing requirements’ definition of independent directors. See Michael S. Weisbach, 
Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 446–47 (1988). The next was the 
logarithm of board size, the number of directors serving on the board. David Yermack, Higher 
Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 197 
(1996). The third was the Entrenchment Index developed by Lucian A. Bebchuk, et al., What 
Matters in Corporate Governance? 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 785 (2009), an index ranging from 
zero to six, with one point for each of the six provisions in the corporate charter or bylaws 
including the inclusion of staggered boards, poison pills, golden parachute, and supermajority 
requirements for amendments to the charter, bylaws, and mergers. Taken together, the 
governance variables do not appear to associate with excess returns due to the SOX or JOBS 
Act that we found elsewhere in this article. 
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Circuit should consider these results when it is eventually called upon 
to determine whether corporate political transparency regulations are 
allowable. 
I.  LACK OF AN SEC RULE ON POLITICAL SPENDING 
While the SEC requires public firms to divulge many details of 
their financial health, corporate governance structures, and 
outstanding liabilities, it does not require public firms to inform 
investors about their political spending.26 Before 2010, not having such 
a disclosure rule made a certain amount of sense, as corporate 
political spending was generally barred in federal elections and in 
nearly half of state elections.27 
The absence of an SEC political spending rule post-Citizens 
United, however, is not an indication of shareholders’ lack of desire 
for such a rule.28 To the contrary, shareholders have launched several 
 
 26.  John C. Coates, IV, SEC’s Non-Decision Decision on Corporate Political Activity a 
Policy and Political Mistake, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 13, 
2013 at 8:51 AM) [hereinafter Coates, Non-Decision], https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
corpgov/2013/12/13/secs-non-decision-decision-on-corporate-political-activity-a-policy-and-
political-mistake/ (arguing that the SEC’s decision to remove disclosure of political activities 
from its agenda “is a policy mistake, as it ignores the best research on the point . . . and 
perpetuates a key loophole in the investor-relevant disclosure rules, allowing large companies to 
omit material information about the politically inflected risks they run with other people’s 
money”). Coates also argues it is a political mistake “as it repudiates the 600,000+ investors who 
have written to the SEC personally to ask it to adopt a rule requiring such disclosure, and will 
let entrenched business interests focus their lobbying solely on watering down regulation . . . 
rather than having also to work to influence a disclosure regime.” Id; Dina El Boghdady, SEC 
Drops Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending from its Priority List, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 
2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sec-drops-disclosure-of-
corporate-political-spending-from-its-priority-list/2013/11/30/f2e92166-5a07-11e3-8304-
caf30787c0a9_story.html. 
 27.  Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2011), 
www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607 (“While the ruling does not directly affect state laws, 
there are 24 states that currently prohibit or restrict corporate and/or union spending on 
candidate elections.”); but see Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency 
Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871 (2004) (indicating that even before Citizens 
United, corporations were a source of funds for campaigns and that executives would donate 
money and receive money in back in the form of “bonuses”). 
 28.  See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 2, at 937 (“[P]ublic companies spend significant 
amounts of shareholder money on politics, and the levels and recipients of the spending are not 
transparent to investors . . . in response, shareholders have increasingly expressed strong 
interest in receiving information on political spending from the companies they own.”); 
Christopher P. Skroupa, Investors Want Disclosure of Corporate Political Contributions and 
Lobbying Expenditures, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
christopherskroupa/2012/04/20/investors-want-disclosure-of-corporate-political-contributions-
and-lobbying-expenditures-2/ (“A 2011 Si2 study found that S&P 500 companies spent a total of 
$1.1 billion on 2010 political contributions. Of this figure, 87% or $973 million went to federal 
lobbying expenditure. Note this figure does not include corporate lobbying expenditures for 
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campaigns to bring corporate political spending out of the shadows.29 
Some campaigns have targeted individual firms,30 while others have 
been aimed at the SEC, urging it to require uniform disclosure for all 
public companies.31 At four firms in 2014, the majority of shareholders 
voted for transparency.32 Several corporations have responded 
positively to these campaigns,33 even though the SEC has not.34 As a 
result, there is a mix of private ordering, with some corporations 
 
state and local governments . . . .”). 
 29.  Eleanor Bloxham, What’s Behind All the Corporate Secrecy over Political Spending?, 
CNN MONEY (Jan. 9, 2013 1:13 PM), http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2013/01/09/ 
corporations-dark-money-qualcomm/ (“Qualcomm has a very low 2012 score on the CPA-
Zicklin Index of corporate political disclosure and accountability, with a zero in all disclosure 
categories except one.”); Nicholas Confessore, State Comptroller Sues Qualcomm for Data 
About Its Political Contributions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
01/04/nyregion/new-york-comptroller-sues-qualcomm-for-data-on-political-giving.html?_r=1& 
(explaining the general lawsuit but without mentioning the records and book-keeping issue). 
 30.  Bank of Am. Corp. SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 71855 (Feb. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/trilliumassetstephen022912-14a8.pdf 
(allowing shareholders at Bank of America to file a shareholder proposal regarding the 
company’s political spending); Home Depot Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 291324 
(Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-
8/2011/northstarasset032511-14a8.pdf (allowing shareholders at Home Depot to file a 
shareholder proposal regarding the company’s political spending); Comment Letter to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, from Heidi Welsh, Exec. Dir., 
Sustainable Inv. Inst., (Oct. 30, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-
1149.pdf) (“Investors filed 282 shareholder resolutions about corporate political spending from 
2010 to 2012. These proposals accounted for 41 percent of all votes on social and environmental 
issues in 2012. . . . The vast majority (79 percent) asked companies to disclose more about 
spending before and after elections.”). 
 31.  Disclosure Comm. Petition, supra note at 5; see also Petition for Rulemaking No. 4-
593, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, from James Evan Dallas (Jan. 
22, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2010/petn4-593.pdf (seeking a 
“Rulemaking in Reaction to Citizens United”). 
 32.  Shareholder majorities endorsed proposals at Lorillard, Valero Energy, and Sallie 
Mae—where a majority voted for disclosure of lobbying expenses—and at Dean Foods—where 
a majority voted for disclosure of campaign spending. See Sara Murphy, What Companies Don't 
Want You to Know About the Millions They Spend, MOTLEY FOOL (July 13, 2014), 
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/07/13/what-companies-dont-want-you-to-know-
about-the-mil.aspx; Heidi Welsh, U.S. Shareholder Proposals Filed on Corporate Political 
Activity, 2010–2014, SUSTAINABLE INVS. INST. (July 2, 2014), 
https://si2news.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/corporate-political-activity-shareholder-proposals-
2010-2014-as-of-7-2-14.pdf.  
 33.  CTR FOR POL. ACCOUNTABILITY, 2013 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE 
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCLOSURE: HOW LEADING COMPANIES ARE 
STRENGTHENING THEIR POLITICAL SPENDING POLICIES 12 (Sept. 24, 2013), available at 
http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/8047 (illustrating 
the 2013 top five ranking companies for disclosure and accountability).  
 34.  Andy Kroll, The SEC Won't Force Corporations to Disclose Their Political Spending 
(Yet), MOTHER JONES (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/12/sec-corporate-
political-disclosure-mary-jo-white (noting corporate disclosure is on the SEC’s “backburner” for 
2014). 
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disclosing their political spending while others do not.35 The SEC 
should intervene to make disclosures uniform for all public 
corporations. Although uniformity could also come from Congress,36 
the SEC has the advantage of being able to act on disclosure more 
quickly than Congress.37 
II.  CONTEXT: DARK MONEY AND THE NEED FOR A POST-CITIZENS 
UNITED RULE FROM THE SEC 
Had the SEC required corporations to disclose political spending 
pre-2010, there would have been little to report. Corporations were 
generally forbidden from participating in elections using general 
corporate treasury funds. Rather corporations could participate 
through affiliated political action committees (PACs) that raised their 
own funds from shareholders and others associated with the 
corporation. That all changed with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Citizens United v. FEC.38 
 
 
 35.  See HEIDI WELSH & ROBIN YOUNG, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF POLITICAL 
EXPENDITURES: 2011 BENCHMARK REPORT ON S&P 500 COMPANIES (2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959566, where the authors comment: 
[O]versight and transparency about spending policies have increased substantially, as 
boards appear to be responding to intense pressures from investors as well as the 
changed regulatory landscape since Citizens United. But disclosure of what companies 
spend remains inconsistent—particularly when it comes to indirect spending through 
trade associations and other politically active non-profit groups. 
Id. at 14; see also Bruce Freed & Karl Sandstrom, SEC Should Force Companies to Disclose 
their Political Spending, REUTERS (June 24, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-
debate/2013/06/24/sec-should-force-companies-to-disclose-their-political-spending/ (“For the 
fourth year in a row . . . [investors have] backed political disclosure proposals . . . . The number 
of resolutions has held steady for the past several years. Public polls have shown that disclosure 
is supported overwhelmingly by shareholders, directors and the public at large.”). 
 36.  See, e.g., Shareholder Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 1734, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Shareholder Protection Act, H.R.  2517, 112th Cong. (2011); Shareholder Protection Act, S. 
1360, 112th Cong. (2011); Shareholder Protection Act, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 37.  Michael Megaris, The SEC and Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Spending by 
Publicly Traded Companies, 22 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 432, 441 (2013) (“Given the inherent 
difficulties found in passing any form of legislation in Congress, and with the defeat of the 
[Shareholder Protection Act] and [the] DISCLOSE Act specifically in mind, the SEC is clearly 
best situated to adopt a policy concerning mandatory disclosure of political spending to 
shareholders, particularly when compared to Congress.”). 
 38.  558 U.S. 310 (2010); Paul Blumenthal, Citizens United Reform, Requiring 
Corporations to Disclose Political Spending, Sought from SEC, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 26, 
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/26/citizens-united-reform-corporations-political-
spending-sec_n_1380094.html (“The event in front of SEC headquarters continued efforts by 
reform groups and elected officials to fix disclosure loopholes opened and expanded by the 
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United.”). 
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Much to the chagrin of those who believe corporate spending in 
elections could lead to political corruption,39 in 2010 the Supreme 
Court built on precedent that created corporate political speech rights 
in ballot initiatives.40 In Citizens United the Court allowed 
corporations (and unions, by implication) to spend their treasury 
funds on political advertisements in local, state, and federal candidate 
elections.41 This grant of a new constitutional right for public 
corporations to spend in elections is a potentially compelling reason 
why the SEC should require disclosure of corporate political 
spending.42 
The SEC would be on firm constitutional ground in requiring 
increased political spending disclosure by public corporations. Indeed, 
in Citizens United the Supreme Court presumed that the new 
corporate political spending would be transparent.43 Writing for the 
 
 39.  Brief for Retired Justices of the Montana Supreme Court, et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 7, Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (No. 
11-1179), 2012 WL 1829056 at *7 (“The surge in spending in judicial elections has already had a 
profound and detrimental impact on the public's confidence in the integrity and independence 
of state judicial systems.”); Brief of American Civil Liberties Union of Montana Foundation as 
Amicus Curiae in support of Defendants-Appellants 3, W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Atty. Gen. 
Mont., 363 Mont. 220 (2012) (No. DA 11-0081) (“Corporate corruption of the electoral process 
can take many forms, limited only by the ingenuity of those attempting to corrupt the 
process.”); Julian Brookes, Lawrence Lessig on How Money Corrupts Congress - and How to 
Stop It, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/national-
affairs/lawrence-lessig-on-how-money-corrupts-congress-and-how-to-stop-it-20111005 (“It also 
leads Americans to believe that Congress is just bought . . . which makes them cynical and less 
engaged, and therefore leaves the fox guarding the hen house.’”).  
 40.  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (allowing corporations 
to spend on ballot initiatives). 
 41.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (“[T]he Government may not suppress political speech 
on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies 
limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”); Benjamin I. Sachs, 
Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights after Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
800, 802 (2012) (noting “[a]fter the decision, campaign finance law leaves unions and 
corporations equally unconstrained and free to use their general treasuries to fund federal 
electoral expenditures”). This was similar to the Court’s approach in Bellotti, where the Court 
stated that the Constitution protects corporations except for “[c]ertain ‘purely personal’ 
guarantees.” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779 n.14; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 434 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Over the years, the limitations on corporate political 
spending have been modified in a number of ways, as Congress responded to changes in the 
American economy and political practices that threatened to displace the commonweal.”). 
 42.  Jennifer S. Taub, Money Managers in the Middle: Seeing and Sanctioning Political 
Spending After Citizens United, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 443 (2012) (“[W]ith 
Citizens United v. FEC, the United States Supreme Court vastly expanded the First 
Amendment rights of corporations to engage in political spending.”). 
 43.  Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens 
United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 997 (2011) (“Chief Justice 
Roberts's opinion effectively linked up electoral integrity and voter information by suggesting 
an overarching public interest in being able to monitor and understand the workings of the 
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majority, Justice Kennedy noted: 
With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures 
can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed 
to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their 
positions and supporters. Shareholders can determine whether 
their corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s 
interest in making profits, and citizens can see whether elected 
officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.44 
The Supreme Court has been clear that disclosing the sources of 
political spending is allowed.45 A new SEC rule revealing corporate 
political spending at its source is necessary to give meaning to the 
Court’s holding.46 Absent such regulatory action, the money is likely 
to remain in the shadows. Indeed, despite the clear message from the 
Supreme Court that disclosure is perfectly constitutional,47 the 2010 
and 2012 federal elections were marred with hundreds of millions of 
dollars of untraceable funds known colloquially as “dark money.”48 
 
political process.”); Richard Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance 
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J. L. & POL. 557 (2012). 
 44.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45.  E.g., id. at 319 (“The Government may regulate corporate political speech through 
disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.”). 
 46.  Disclosure Comm. Petition, supra note 5, at 7 (“Because the Commission’s current 
rules do not require public companies to give shareholders detailed information on corporate 
spending on politics, shareholders cannot play the role the Court described.”). 
 47.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369 (“The Court has explained that disclosure is a less 
restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech . . . . And the Court has 
upheld registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has no 
power to ban lobbying itself.”); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of 
Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1057, 1079 (2011) (“Citizens United gave a full-throated endorsement of disclosure 
based on both the voters’ informational interest as well as, in the case of corporations, the 
shareholders’ interest in holding corporations accountable for their political spending. The 
Supreme Court also upheld disclosure information about ballot measure petition signatories in 
Doe v. Reed in 2010.”). 
 48.  Brief for U.S. Representatives Robert Brady, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 3, Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012), (No. 11-1179), 
2012 WL 1829057 at *3 (“Citizens and shareholders are too often unable to see, as the Court put 
it, ‘whether elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests,’’ and are thus 
unable ‘to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and 
supporters.’” (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.)); 
Justice James C. Nelson (Ret.), Justice at Risk: Montana’s Fight For Impartial Courts, 
Constitution Day Speech delivered at the University of Montana School of Law 3 (Sept. 17, 
2013), available at http://www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Judicial%20Independence%20Speech% 
20Sept%20%2017%202013.pdf (“Citizens United ushered in the unprecedented use of dark, 
individual and institutional mega-money to influence elections and, effectively, to silence the 
voices of individual small contributors and ordinary voters.”); see also MIMI MURRAY DIGBY 
MARZIANI, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, MONEY IN POLITICS AFTER CITIZENS UNITED: 
TROUBLING TRENDS & POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, (2012), available at 
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Although this dark money was not entirely corporate, corporations 
are surely a source of some dark money.49 
How was some corporate spending able to remain “dark?” In a 
nutshell, corporations are still legally banned from giving directly to 
candidates for federal office in the United States.50 Instead, 
corporations have two major avenues for political engagement in 
American elections: (1) through the corporation’s own corporate 
PAC, funded by voluntary contributions of up to $5,000 by employees 
and other persons affiliated with the corporation;51 or (2) through the 
use of corporate treasury funds to buy political ads to support or 
oppose political candidates.52 If the corporation does not wish to 
spend openly on political ads (for example, Exxon produces and airs 
an ad urging voters to vote for a particular candidate for president), 
then the corporation can spend through an intermediary to mask its 
involvement in the ad’s production and funding.53 Typically, the 
intermediary is a nonprofit organized under §501(c)(4) or §501(c)(6) 




 49.  Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Safeguarding Markets from Pernicious Pay to Play: A Model 
Explaining Why the SEC Regulates Money in Politics, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 361, 394 (2013). 
 50.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320 (“Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA), federal law prohibited—and still does prohibit—corporations and unions from using 
general treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures 
that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in 
connection with certain qualified federal elections.”). 
 51.  Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he $5,000 
limitation on the amount that persons may contribute to multicandidate political committees 
violates neither the First nor the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 52.  Craig Holman, The Tension Between Lobbying and Campaign Finance Laws: Rolling 
Back Gains Made Under the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 13 
ELECTION L.J. 45, 56–57 (2014) (“[C]orporations (and, by implication, labor unions) [were] 
given First Amendment rights to spend unlimited corporate treasury funds in federal, state, and 
judicial elections.”). 
 53.  Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 
ELECTION L.J. 337 (2011) (“Given the anecdotal evidence that many business corporations 
interested in electoral activity are reluctant to do so directly and publicly and prefer to channel 
their money through intermediary organizations, nonprofit (c)(4)s and (c)(6)s in the post-
Citizens United regime play a key role as vehicles for collecting, pooling, and spending business 
corporation funds to influence elections.”). 
 54.  26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(4) (West 2014) (“Civic leagues or organizations not organized for 
profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of 
employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a designated person or 
persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to 
charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.”); § 501(c)(6) (“Business leagues, chambers of 
commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues (whether or not 
administering a pension fund for football players), not organized for profit and no part of the 
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have to disclose their underlying donors to the public under most 
circumstances.55 
Hence, when a corporation spends through an opaque and 
politically active nonprofit, the public viewing the ad cannot discern 
the true source of the money.56 Consequently, voters and shareholders 
alike are left wondering who is paying for political ads.57 Many voters 
would like to know who is backing or attacking a candidate for 
office.58 Likewise, many investors want to know whether their 
corporations are wasting material resources on politics.59 Despite 
 
net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”). 
 55.  Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and 
Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure 
Laws, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL’Y 59, 92 (2011) [hereinafter Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding 
Behind the Tax Code] (“Much of this undisclosed spending was done through 501(c)(4)s and 
501(c)(6)s.”); Briffault, supra note 53, at 338 (“[M]ultiple individuals, multiple corporations, or 
multiple corporations and individuals may, without monetary limit, pool their funds in nonprofit 
organizations that finance independent expenditures—and, of course, those independent 
expenditures may not be subject to a monetary limit either.”).  
 56.  PUB. CITIZEN, 12 MONTHS AFTER: THE EFFECTS OF CITIZENS UNITED ON ELECTIONS 
AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 12 (2011), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Citizens-United-20110113.pdf (finding “[g]roups that did not 
provide any information about their sources of money collectively spent $135.6 million, 46.1 
percent of the total spent by outside groups during the [2010] election cycle.”); BLAIR BOWIE & 
ADAM LIOZ, DEMOS, BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY: THE UNPRECEDENTED ROLE OF 
MONEY IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS 5 (2013), available at  http://www.demos.org/sites/default/ 
files/publications/BillionDollar Democracy_Demos.pdf (“For the 2012 election cycle, 31% of all 
reported outside spending was ‘secret spending,’ coming from organizations that are not 
required to disclose the original source of their funds.”). 
 57.  Brief of the Center for Political Accountability and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin 
Center For Business Ethics Research as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at 13, Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2349016 at *13 [hereinafter Zicklin 
Center Amicus Brief] (responding to the appellant’s brief noting “shareholders can exercise 
their important oversight function only if they are aware of the corporation’s political activities. 
Eliminating disclosure requirements is tantamount to asking shareholders to conduct oversight 
while blindfolded”). 
 58.  See Liz Kennedy, Citizens Actually United: The Bi-Partisan Opposition to Corporate 
Political Spending and Support for Common Sense Reform, DEMOS (Oct. 25, 2012), 
http://www.demos.org/publication/citizens-actually-united-bi-partisan-opposition-corporate-
political-spending-and-support (citing a 2012 poll by Bannon showing that 81 percent of 
Americans agree that companies should only spend money on political campaigns if they 
disclose their spending immediately.). 
 59.  For a discussion of the shareholder rights implicated by Citizens United, see Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 83, 84 (2010) (arguing for rules that “mandate detailed and robust disclosure to 
shareholders of the amounts and beneficiaries of a corporation’s political spending, whether 
made directly by the company or indirectly through intermediaries”); Paul S. Miller, 
Shareholder Rights: Citizens United and Delaware Corporate Governance Law, 28 J.L. & POL. 
51, 53 (2012) (arguing that shareholders’ association rights justify limiting corporate political 
activities); CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CORPORATE CAMPAIGN 
SPENDING, GIVING SHAREHOLDERS A VOICE, 21–23 (2010), available at 
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these concurrent broad social interests, the corporate, tax, and 
campaign finance laws and regulations have largely lagged behind the 
post-2010 ability of corporations to spend in politics, frustrating 
investors who seek this basic knowledge.60 For example, at the time of 
this writing, four years after Citizens United, Congress has failed to 
pass a single piece of legislation to address the decision;61 nor has the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) promulgated a single Citizens 
United regulation on disclosure.62 
Further compounding the problem, 2010 witnessed the advent of 
new forceful players on the political battlefield: Super PACs. Super 
PACs are entities that can aggregate unlimited money from unlimited 
sources, so long as they exclude money from foreign nationals.63 Super 
PACs arose out of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow.org v. 
FEC,64 which relied heavily on the reasoning in Citizens United. In the 
 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/shareholdersvoice2_5_10.pd
f (arguing for shareholder disclosure and consent); Taub, supra note 42, at 450 (proposing that 
“disclosure and consent should travel down the full intermediation chain where ultimate 
investors can see and sanction or oppose corporate political spending”); Comment Letter from 
Jack Bogle, Pres., Bogle Fin. Mkts. Research. Ctr., to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-22.pdf 
(“I urge the Commission to stand back for a moment from the issue of full disclosure of 
corporate contributions to decide whether corporate shareholders should not first decide 
whether a corporation should make any political contribution whatsoever without the approval 
of its shareholders.”). 
 60.  Brief for AARP, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13, Am. Tradition 
P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012), (No. 11-1179), 2012 WL 1853623 at *13 
(“Corporations have clear incentives to avoid disclosure and accountability; federal tax and 
campaign finance laws, as well as state campaign finance laws, have accommodated their desire 
to do so.”); Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, supra note 55, at 77–86. 
 61.  R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SUPER PACS IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: 
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 24–25, (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/R42042.pdf (noting “a policy question for Congress may be whether the 
implications of the current reporting requirements represent ‘loopholes’ that should be closed 
or whether existing requirements are sufficient”); but see Jeremy Miller, The DISCLOSE Act, 
Yet Again No Profiles in Courage, CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY & ETHICS IN WASHINGTON 
(July 17, 2012), http://www.citizensforethics.org/blog/entry/no-profiles-in-courage-us-senate-
rejects-disclose-act (noting the multiple failed attempts to pass the DISCLOSE Act—legislation 
which would have brought more transparency to political spending post-Citizens United). 
 62.  Shane Goldmacher, Four Years Later, FEC May Finally Update Its Books with 
Citizens United Ruling, NAT’L J. (June 8, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/four-
years-later-fec-may-finally-update-its-books-with-em-citizens-united-em-ruling-20140608.  
 63.  ANTHONY CORRADO, COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE 
PROBLEM OF TRANSPARENCY IN POLITICAL FINANCE 7 (2013), available at 
http://www.ced.org/pdf/Hiding_in_Plain_Sight_July_2013.pdf, [hereinafter CORRADO, IN PLAIN 
SIGHT], (“Intermediary groups can serve as vehicles for masking the actual donors funding 
campaign related expenditures. They can function as pass throughs to veil contributions from 
public view.”). 
 64.  599 F.3d 686, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010) (holding that an 
FEC provision limiting contributions by individuals to political committees that made only 
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2012 election, Super PACs raised $828,224,595,65 including at least 
some dark money.66 Thus, although Super PACs themselves are 
transparent because they are legally required to disclose their donors 
to the FEC, there is no requirement that the entities that give to 
Super PACs be similarly transparent.67 Thus, dark money from 
nonprofits may fund otherwise transparent groups.68 To the extent this 
money originates from corporate treasuries, this poses a potential 
problem for investors as scholars have strongly contested the utility of 
this nonmarket strategy.69 
 Corporations have many stakeholders.70 These include 
shareholders, employees, the community, the environment, and even 
 
independent expenditures violated the First Amendment, and organizational and continuous 
reporting provisions of FECA did not violate the First Amendment). 
 65.  Super PACs Cycle 2012, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
pacs/superpacs.php?cycle=2012 (last visited, July 8, 2014). 
 66.  Cynthia L. Bauerly & Eric C. Hallstrom, Square Pegs: The Challenges for Existing 
Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Age of the Super PAC, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 329, 337–38 (2012) (discussing Super PACs). 
 67.  GARRETT, supra note 61, at 24–25 (noting “[i]n particular, relationships between super 
PACs and possibly related entities, such as 527 and 501(c) organizations, generally cannot be 
widely or reliably established based on current reporting requirements[.]”).  
 68.  See 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(4) (West 2014); § 501(c)(6).  
 69.  Michael Hadani, Institutional Ownership Monitoring and Corporate Political Activity: 
Governance Implications, 65 J. OF BUS. RES. 944, 948 (2012) (“It was also argued that the largest 
institutional investor will likely oppose CPA [Corporate Political Activity], not only given the 
covert nature of CPA, but also given the fact that their money may be used for political speech 
which they may oppose.”). See also John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and 
Value Before and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 691 (2012) 
[hereinafter Coates, Corporate Politics] (“Without disclosure reforms, the fact and extent of 
political activity will remain only partly revealed, with past and prospective investors having to 
infer the condition of the corporate patient from superficial and often misleading features, such 
as short-term recent stock-price performance, of the kind that lulled investors into thinking that 
all was well with Enron and Lehman Brothers until it was too late for them to do anything . . . 
.”); see also John Coates, Can Shareholders Save Democracy, Remarks at the Accountability 
After Citizens United Symposium (Apr. 29, 2011), available at  
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/pages/accountability_after_citizens_united (“Citizens 
United now means we’ve got a whole new avenue to reinforce the power that corporations have 
had already through lobbying and through PAC activity, to expand the influence of those two 
others and to have an additional weapon. And so I think this is only going to get worse over 
time. I think that shareholders are going to find themselves more and more frequently in 
conflict with management over this.”). For further scholarly examples of this debate over the 
utility of corporate political spending, see Rajesh Aggarwal, Felix Meschke, & Tracy Wang, 
Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency?, 14 BUS. & POL., vol. 1, art. 3 (Apr. 2012); 
Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, Procuring “Justice”?: Citizens United, Caperton, and Partisan 
Judicial Elections, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 89, 109 (2010) (“There is little evidence to suggest 
that these executives will be careful, thoughtful, or responsible with the new ability to spend 
shareholder funds at their disposal.”). 
 70.  David G. Yosifon, Discourse Norms as Default Rules: Structuring Corporate Speech to 
Multiple Stakeholders, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 189, 212 (2011) (proposing “an alteration in the 
discourse norms that govern the firm's relationship with different stakeholders”). 
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governments.71 Here we suggest that, among a corporation’s 
stakeholders, its shareholders should be most concerned with the cost 
of corporate political spending and potential new compliance costs 
that go with it.72 Shareholders bear the cost of corporate political 
spending by indirectly subsidizing it through their investments.73 And 
similarly, shareholders would bear the indirect costs of compliance 
with any new disclosure rules.74 
On the other hand, shareholders may benefit from disclosure rules 
through added transparency and improved internal controls of 
political spending once the company implements a system to comply 
with new rules.75 Such disclosure should translate to reduced 
monitoring costs from the shareholder perspective as well.76 
 
 71.  R. EDWARD FREEMAN, S. RAMAKRISHNA VELAMURI, & BRIAN MORIARTY, 
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE ETHICS, COMPANY STAKEHOLDER 
RESPONSIBILITY: A NEW APPROACH TO CSR 7–10 (2006), available at http://www.corporate-
ethics.org/pdf/csr.pdf (articulating “ten principles of company stakeholder responsibility,” 
emphasizing employees, the community, the environment, and governments). 
 72.  Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 59, at 97–101 (highlighting the importance of 
shareholders with respect to corporate political spending); Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a 
Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 312 (2011) (arguing that “the empowerment of stakeholder investors 
presents the only currently viable means for stakeholders to influence the behavior of the 
American public corporation”).  
 73.  Sabina Bunt Thaler, Citizens United and Forced Speech: Why Protecting the Dissenting 
Shareholder Necessitates Disclosure of Corporate Political Expenditures After Citizens United v. 
FEC, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 591, 622 (2011) (“[S]hareholders are 
contributing money to a cause from which they expect to realize some benefit. Consequently, 
shareholders are purchasing a stake in a corporation. . . . Corporations then use shareholders’ 
money to run the business. Therefore, when corporations spend money on political or 
ideological electioneering, they are . . . spending their contributor’s money.”). 
 74.  Zicklin Center Amicus Brief, supra note 57, at 17 (“The views of [public corporations 
and managers] do not mirror those of shareholders and employees, who often represent a 
diverse cross-section of the public. Though many individual shareholders and directors vocally 
oppose questionable uses of corporate funds, they lack the means to significantly influence 
corporate political spending decisions.”). 
 75.  See Coates, Corporate Politics, supra note 40, at 690 (“If Congress, states, or the SEC 
adopt rules attempting to give shareholders more information or more authority in the political 
sphere, the evidence presented here should help demonstrate that such legislation serves as a 
legitimate and compelling purpose separate from the anti-corruption and other purposes that 
have traditionally justified campaign finance laws.”). 
 76.  Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 
55 DUKE L.J. 711, 738 (2006) (“Mandatory disclosure duties reduce the cost of searching for 
information.”); Comment Letter from Dr. Susan Holmberg, Program Dir., Ctr. Popular Econ., 
to Ms. Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. at 8 (Nov. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-12.pdf (“The expected benefits of mandatory 
disclosure of corporate political spending would be substantial. Disclosure would help to 
mitigate the moral hazard problems inherent in [corporate political activity] by diminishing the 
monitoring costs for shareholders, allowing them to make more informed investment 
decisions.”). 
TORRES-SPELLISCY 9.22.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/2015  4:35 PM 
2014] RUNNING THE D.C. CIRCUIT 151 
Political spending by corporations heightens the agency problem 
inherent between shareholders and managers acting ostensibly on 
shareholders’ behalf because current disclosure rules do not allow 
shareholders to monitor how corporate managers spend corporate 
assets on political causes.77 Harvard Professor John Coates has noted 
that publicly-traded corporations’ political spending raises risks for 
firms: 
At a minimum, it should be clear that political activity creates 
distinct and difficult-to-model risks. Dozens of studies . . . support 
the view that political activity can harm shareholder interests. 
These harms can flow through many channels—from reputational 
harm to dilution of strategic focus, from politically risky 
acquisition bets or capital investments to state laws deterring 
takeovers. To adequately assess those risks, shareholders need 
basic, standardized information about political activity—before 
investing, and afterwards, to monitor corporate performance and 
make informed decisions. Disclosure of such information is 
squarely within the SEC’s charge, which has long included 
disclosure of information under Rule 14a-8 relating to social and 
political issues of general public interest, under executive 
compensation disclosure requirements that bear on management 
conflicts of interest that would not directly have a material impact 
on firm value, and under the FCPA relating to corporate 
connections to foreign political officials. Disclosure of political 
activity would deliver significant benefits to investors at a low 
cost.78 
The Committee for Economic Development (CED), a group of 
CEOs and other business executives, agrees with Professor Coates’s 
assessment. In a recently released report, the CED concluded 
“[p]olitical activity also exposes companies to substantial reputational 
and legal risks that endanger enterprise and shareholder value. These 
risks are particularly pronounced in the case of contributions made to 
third party groups where the donor does not exercise control over the 
ways that funds are spent.”79 
 
 
 77.  Id. at 4 (“In the [corporate political activity] context, there is considerable potential for 
personal advantages to corporate executives, particularly prestige, a future political career, and 
star power . . . or to help political allies . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 78.  Coates, Non-Decision, supra note 26.  
 79.  COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., AFTER CITIZENS UNITED: IMPROVING ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
POLITICAL FINANCE 5 (2011), available at http://www.ced.org/pdf/After-Citizens-United.pdf. 
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 The CED has urged across-the-board transparency for political 
spending, regardless of the source, arguing “[a]ny organization that 
spends money advocating candidates or paying for other 
electioneering activities—whether a political committee, tax-exempt 
501(c) organization, or for-profit corporation—should publicly 
disclose the sources of the funding used to finance these 
expenditures.”80 Another recent study, published by the Mercatus 
Center, reaches similar conclusions.81 
Glass Lewis, a leading proxy advisory service, has also noted that 
corporate political spending is accompanied by reputational risks. 
As the line between candidate ads and issue ads has blurred, 
companies that have donated to some of these groups may face 
significant reputational risks. While these organizations may be 
funded through soft money or may legally not be required to 
disclose their donors, questionable actions on behalf of these 
groups could cause the release of information regarding their 
donors. For example, in November 2012, a Montana judge allowed 
the release of the bank records of the Western Tradition 
Partnership . . . , a 501(c)(4) organization that had been extensively 
involved in the recent Montana elections.82 
Further, the Conference Board’s Committee on Corporate Political 
Spending, a business research group, wrote in a 2011 report: 
Corporate political contributions are subject to a highly complex 
web of federal, state and local laws and regulations. Failure to 
comply can lead to costly lawsuits, civil or criminal charges, and 
consequent damage to a company’s image and reputation. 
Corporate political activities are closely scrutinized by public-
interest groups and the media. As a result, a corporation’s direct or 
indirect political spending can put its reputation at risk and could 
adversely affect its business if the company takes a controversial 
position or supports a candidate who holds positions that are 
 
 80.  CORRADO, IN PLAIN SIGHT, supra note 63, at 8.  
 81.  Russell Sobel & Rachel Graefe-Anderson, The Relationship Between Political 
Connections and the Financial Performance of Industries and Firms 5 (Mercatus Ctr. Working 
Paper No. 14-18, 2014), available at http://mercatus.org/publication/relationship-between-
political-connections-and-financial-performance-industries-firms (“We find little evidence to 
support the idea that political activity undertaken by corporations leads to improved 
performance for firms and their shareholders at both the industry and firm level. We do 
however find a robust and significant positive relationship between political activity and 
executive compensation.”). 
 82.  COURTENEY KEATINGE & DAVID EATON, POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS: A GLASS 
LEWIS ISSUE REPORT 5 (2012), available at http://politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=a 
/GetDocumentAction/i/7544.  
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inconsistent with its corporate values or the views of a significant 
number of its workers, shareholders or customers.83 
Transparency is necessary so that investors can properly weigh these 
risks before investing.84 
III.  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: THE LOOMING OBSTACLE TO A NEW 
SEC RULE ON CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING 
The open question for policy makers today is how to deal with 
corporate political spending.85 Because other academic papers have 
dealt with the constitutionality of and various policy questions 
surrounding disclosure of corporate political spending,86 this article 
addresses the thorny administrative law issue of an agency’s cost-
benefit analysis in light of the D.C. Circuit’s inevitable review.87 The 
cost-benefit calculus for SEC disclosures and other regulations is not 
just an economic matter for regulated companies; increasingly it is a 
legal matter for the SEC, which is subject to a seemingly endless 
parade of lawsuits over its rulemaking in the powerful D.C. Circuit.88 
 
 83.  CONF. BD. COMM. ON CORPORATE POL. SPENDING, CORPORATE POLITICAL 
SPENDING, POLICIES AND PRACTICES, ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCLOSURE 7 (2011), available 
at https://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=corporate-political-spending-
Committee-Report---Advance-Copy.pdf&type=subsite; see also Michael Stocker & Matthew 
Moehlman, Are Shareholders Happy With Your Company's Political Spending?, CORP. 
COUNSEL (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/MediaMentions/09-
26-2012_CorporateCounsel.pdf (“Corporate political spending may also expose companies to 
profit-impairing reputational risks.”).  
 84.  William Alan Nelson, II, Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative Claims of 
Corporate Waste to Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, 13 NEV. L.J. 134, 
167 (2012) (“Corporations can decrease the risk of facing a shareholder derivative complaint by 
improving the transparency of independent political expenditures and improving policies 
governing those expenditures. Corporations should have a stated policy for political spending 
and also a committee that can monitor the political expenditure program.”). 
 85.  See Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court As Prometheus: 
Breathing Life into the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 553 (2012) (calling on 
Congress to “strengthen disclaimer and disclosure requirements”). For various legislative efforts 
addressing this question, see Iowa Senate File 2354, signed by Governor Chester Culver, April 8, 
2010; MD Elec. Law §§ 13–306 and 307, and the statutes cited supra note 36. 
 86.  Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 2, at 954 (highlighting the possibility of First 
Amendment consequences for the mandatory disclosure of corporate political spending); 
Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 49, at 411 (discussing political corporate spending post-Citizens 
United). 
 87.  SUSAN HOLMBERG, ROOSEVELT INST., A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE 
POLITICAL SPENDING DISCLOSURE 1 (2013), available at  http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org 
/sites/all/files/2013_10_30_Holmberg_Cost_Benefit.pdf (providing “a generalized cost-benefit 
analysis of a potential rule promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that 
would require public corporations to disclose corporate political spending”).  
 88.  Brad Plumer, The D.C. Circuit is the Court at the Center of the Filibuster Fight. Here’s 
Why it Matters., WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
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The SEC is just one of many regulators that has a claim on 
regulating corporate money in politics. Now that corporations can 
spend directly on political ads in all American federal and state 
elections, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the FEC, 
the SEC, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) all have potential 
jurisdiction.89 Moreover, a corporation’s spending on state elections 
implicates state election laws.90 If corporations use nonprofits as 
conduits, states may try to regulate this behavior through their charity 
bureaus just as New York State did in 2013.91 For the purposes of this 
 
wonkblog/wp/2013/11/21/the-d-c-circuit-court-was-at-the-center-of-the-filibuster-fight-heres-
why-it-matters/ (“The D.C. Circuit is surprisingly powerful—not least because it rules on 
decisions made by federal administrative agencies. If people want to challenge various federal 
regulations in court, the cases often end up here.”); Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis 
of Financial Regulation: Lessons from the SEC's Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 3 (2006) (“[T]he SEC's use—or lack thereof—of cost-benefit analysis in a 
controversial recent rulemaking on the governance of the mutual fund industry shed light on the 
issue for perhaps the first time. . . . [I]n a landmark ruling in June 2005, the D.C. Circuit struck 
down the regulation because the agency failed to satisfy ‘its statutory obligation to determine as 
best it can the economic implications of the rule it has proposed.’” (quoting Chamber of 
Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005))).  
 89.  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., SEC to Propose Rules on Corporate 
Political Spending by April 2013, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(Jan. 9, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/01/09/sec-to-propose-rules-
on-corporate-political-spending-by-april-2013/ (articulating that “[t]he Securities and Exchange 
Commission recently updated its entry in the Office of Management and Budget’s Unified 
Agenda to indicate that, by April, it plans to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 
requiring public companies to disclose their spending on politics”); Jacob Fenton, Political 
Advertisers and TV Stations Ignore Disclosure Rules, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/12/18/political-advertisers-and-tv-stations-ignore-
disclosure-rules (“The most widely-used disclosure form allows [TV] advertisers to check a box 
saying whether the ads are national or local; additional disclosures are only required for 
advertisements that are national in scope. The most common response is to leave both boxes 
blank.”); Robert Kelner, Is Increased Criminal Enforcement of Election Laws on the Way 
Because the FEC and DOJ Are Making Nice-Nice?, INSIDE POL. L. (July 18, 2012), 
http://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/2012/07/18/is-increased-criminal-enforcement-of-election-
laws-on-the-way-because-the-fec-and-doj-are-making-nice-nice/.  
 90.  For an analysis of how state election laws are implicated, see CIARA TORRES-
SPELLISCY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 
6 (2011), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Disclosure% 
20in%20the%20States.pdf (“Before Citizens United, 24 states barred either union or corporate 
political expenditures. Citizens United rendered these laws unconstitutional. Consequently, 
corporations and unions have a new right to spend in states where they were previously barred. 
Therefore, in approximately half of the states, the number of entities that could potentially fund 
future political ads has jumped significantly, while transparency is on the wane.”). 
 91.  Susan E. Golden, et al., New York Nonprofit Revitalization Act Signed Into Law, 
VENABLE LLP & MINORITY CORP. COUNSEL ASS’N, (Dec. 20, 2013), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/282420/Charities+Non-Profits/New+York+Nonprofit+ 
Revitalization+Act+Signed+into+Law (“Its provisions apply to nonprofits that are incorporated 
in New York, but one significant section—related to financial audits and financial reporting to 
the state—applies to all nonprofits that are registered in New York for charitable solicitation 
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article, we focus on the potential regulatory role of the SEC because it 
is the lead regulator of publicly traded corporations in the United 
States.92 
The D.C. Circuit,93 as the court responsible for reviewing the rules 
promulgated by federal agencies including the SEC, has become 
increasingly hostile to novel approaches to business regulations.94 Two 
common justifications the D.C. Circuit has given for why a particular 
SEC regulation is inappropriate are: (1) that the SEC did not conduct 
a sufficient cost-benefit analysis; and (2) that the regulation did not 
 
purposes.”); see also Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Adopts New 
Disclosure Requirements for Nonprofits that Engage in Electioneering, (June 5, 2013), available 
at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-adopts-new-disclosure-requirements-
nonprofits-engage-electioneering (“Effective today, nonprofits that are registered with the state 
will now be required to report the percentage of their expenditures that go to federal, state and 
local electioneering. Groups that spend at least $10,000 to influence state and local elections in 
New York will be required to file itemized schedules of expenses and contributions.”); see also, 
Annual Disclosure of Electioneering Activities by Non-501(c)(3) Registrants, N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13 § 91.6 (West 2014). 
 92.  U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited July 9, 2014); Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n, Chairman’s Address at SEC Speaks 2014 (Feb. 21, 2014), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540822127#.U71kNJRdXrS.  
 93.  Jess Bravin, Why D.C. Circuit, at Center of Nominee Fight, Is So Important, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 20, 2013, 7:29 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304607 
104579210383151449004 (“The [D.C. Circuit] appeals court has shaped enforcement of 
environmental, consumer-protection and antitrust law, and is likely to hear major cases in the 
next few years on greenhouse-gas restrictions and post-2008 financial regulation.”). 
 94.  Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1154–55 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (ruling the SEC was 
arbitrary and capricious in promulgating Rule 14a–11, requiring public companies to provide 
shareholders with information about, and their ability to vote for, shareholder-nominated 
candidates for the board of directors, and is vacated); Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 
F.3d 166, 177–79 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that a rule exempted federal annuity contracts issued 
by a corporation and subject to regulation by state insurance laws from  federal regulation 
through the Securities Act of 1933; SEC failed to properly consider the effect of the rule upon 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation, rule vacated); Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 
F.3d 481, 492–93 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (ruling SEC rule exempting certain broker-dealers from 
Investment Advisers Act (IAA), even if they received special compensation exceeds SEC 
authority and is vacated); Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877–78 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that 
rule requiring that investors in a hedge fund be counted as clients of the fund's adviser for 
purposes of fewer-than-fifteen-clients exemption from registration under IAA was invalid as 
conflicting with purposes underlying the statute); Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F. 2d 406, 407 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that SEC exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating rule barring 
national security exchanges and associations from listing stock of corporations which nullify, 
restrict or disparately reduce per share voting rights of common, rule vacated); Am. Bankers 
Ass’n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 755–56 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (ruling SEC rule 3b-9, which requires banks 
engaging in securities brokerage business for profit to register as broker-dealers under 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is invalid); see also Gordon, supra note 10, at 14 (“the various 
recent decisions of D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals striking down SEC rules on purported BCA 
grounds are far more intelligible on a different principle: the Court’s resistance to the SEC’s 
expansion of its rule-making in areas traditionally dominated by state law.”). 
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further the SEC’s interest in fostering an efficient market for 
securities.95 In an SEC cost-benefit analysis, a regulation’s benefits are 
intrinsically linked to their effect on the stock market.96 If the D.C. 
Circuit is not satisfied that a robust cost-benefit analysis was 
performed,97 or that the rule does not further market efficiency, then 
either reason could be used by a panel of the court inclined to 
invalidate the rule to do so.98 
The D.C. Circuit’s approach to cost-benefit analysis has been 
strongly criticized by many academics,99 including Professor Coates. 
Professor Coates wrote, in response to the decision in Business 
Roundtable v. SEC that, “[t]he D.C. Circuit presented no evidence 
that there is any available scientific technique for the SEC to ‘assess 
the economic effects’ of the [SEC’s] rule along the lines that the court 
 
 95.  Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149–53, 1155–56. 
 96.  David S. Ruder, Balancing Investor Protection with Capital Formation Needs after the 
SEC Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REV. 39, 56 (2005) (“The SEC . . . quantified the 
benefits of the Order Protection Rule. It expressed its belief that although the rule’s price 
protections of New York Stock Exchange . . . and NASDAQ . . . stocks are ‘difficult to 
quantify,’ benefits will be substantial.”); Sherwin, supra note 88, at 47 (“Undoubtedly, 
quantification of costs and benefits, where possible, is one of the most crucial aspects of cost-
benefit analysis.”). 
 97.  Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153 (“In weighing the rule’s costs and benefits, however, 
the Commission arbitrarily ignored the effect of the final rule upon the total number of election 
contests.”). 
 98.  15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(b) (West 2014) (“Whenever . . . the Commission is engaged in 
rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the 
protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.”); Recent Case Commentary, Administrative Law- Corporate Governance 
Regulation-D.C. Circuit Finds Sec Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and Capricious for Inadequate 
Economic Analysis.-Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1088, 1089 (2012) (“The [SEC] explained that Rule 14a-11 would increase corporate 
performance and argued that any costs of the rule were a necessary consequence of enforcing 
traditional state law rights.”). Cost-benefit analysis is also required of the Office of Management 
& Budget (OMB) which must report the costs and benefits of federal regulations to Congress 
on an annual basis. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C.A. § 601 app. at 86–91 (West 2014). 
 99.  Fisch, supra note 11, at 712 (“[E]mpirical analysis of proposed rulemaking has obvious 
limitations. It is difficult to predict the effect that a new rule will have . . . [E]mpirical analysis 
frequently requires regulators to extrapolate from transactions that are not comparable to those 
that are contemplated under the proposal. Thus the reliability of empirical evidence… is 
questionable.”) (citations omitted); James D. Cox & Benjamin J. C. Baucom, The Emperor Has 
No Clothes: Confronting the DC Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority 3 (Mar. 4, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016433 (“What we report 
here is that the level of review invoked by the D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable and its 
earlier decisions is dramatically inconsistent with the standard enacted by Congress. Our 
conclusion is that it is the D.C. Circuit has assumed for itself a role that is opposed to the one 
Congress prescribed for courts reviewing SEC rules.”).  
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seemed to think legally required . . . .”100 While the D.C. Circuit’s 
rulings can be appealed to the Supreme Court, the high court is under 
no obligation to hear the appeal, and takes a relatively small number 
of regulatory cases each year.101 This can leave the D.C. Circuit with 
the final word on the fates of many administrative rules.102 
A. The SEC & Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Cost-benefit analyses have proven to be the Achilles heel of the 
SEC’s regulatory power. The D.C. Circuit pointed to an allegedly 
faulty cost-benefit analysis in invalidating a SEC rule in 2005’s 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. SEC.103 As 
the court explained: 
Uncertainty may limit what the Commission can do, but it does not 
excuse the Commission from its statutory obligation to do what it 
can to apprise itself—and hence the public and the Congress—of 
the economic consequences of a proposed regulation before it 
decides whether to adopt the measure.104 
And the Court has continued to build on this precedent. For 
example, in 2011’s Business Roundtable decision,105 the D.C. Circuit 
undid the SEC’s Dodd-Frank proxy access rule (which would have 
allowed shareholders to nominate directors for inclusion on the 
corporate ballot) in part because the Court held that there had not 
been a robust cost-benefit analysis.106 Some subsequent economic 
 
 100.  Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 9, at 29 (citing Bus. 
Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1154). 
 101.  Federal Courts and What They Do, FED’L JUDICIAL CTR, http://www.fjc.gov/ 
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/FCtsWhat.pdf/$file/FCtsWhat.pdf (last visted Aug. 16, 2014) (“Unlike the 
U.S. courts of appeals . . . the Supreme Court does not have to hear every case that it is asked to 
review.”). 
 102.  Pete Schenkkan, Texas Administrative Law: Trials, Triumphs, and New Challenges, 7 
TEX. TECH ADMN. L.J. 287, 341 (2006) (“The administrative law part of the federal court 
burden is spread widely around the country, all district judges and all circuits. Only the D.C. 
Circuit and D.C. District Courts see more than a pro rata share of administrative law cases . . . 
.”). 
 103.  Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“We 
agree with the Chamber, however, that the Commission did violate the APA by failing 
adequately to consider the costs mutual funds would incur in order to comply with the 
conditions and by failing adequately to consider a proposed alternative to the independent 
chairman condition.”). 
 104.  Id. at 144; see also Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 9, 
at 7 (citing Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit held that the SEC 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously for failing to undertake some effort to quantify the costs of the 
mutual fund governance rule changes it had adopted.”). 
 105.  647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 106.  George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: The Swedish Solution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
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analysis seems to indicate that the D.C. Circuit was wrong in its 
assumptions about the costliness of proxy access.107 But right or wrong, 
they invalidated the proxy access rule.108 As Bruce Kraus explains, 
“[c]ost-benefit litigation has substantially slowed the pace of financial 
reform, and new cost-benefit legislation looms.”109 
Claims of insufficient cost-benefit analysis have been raised in 
other recent challenges. In American Petroleum Institute (API) v. 
SEC,110 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other plaintiffs sued over 
the SEC rule implementing Dodd-Frank section 1504, arguing the 
rule was arbitrary and capricious, had a flawed cost-benefit analysis, 
and violated the First Amendment.111 This rule would have required 
extractive industries to report payments to foreign governments.112 
 
1633, 1663 (2012) (noting that, though Dodd-Frank gave the SEC authority to require boards to 
include shareholder nominations on the issuer’s proxy statement, their rule implementing this 
(14a-11) was struck down by the D.C. Circuit for an inadequate cost-benefit analysis); Coates, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 9 (citing Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 
1149) (“[A] panel of the D.C. Circuit struck the rule down as ‘arbitrary and capricious’ 
[because] twenty-five single-spaced pages devoted to cost-benefit and related analyses in the 
adopting release was inadequate under the APA and ‘failed . . . adequately to assess the 
economic effects of a new rule’”). 
 107.  Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser, & Guthan Subramanian, Does Shareholder Proxy 
Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable's Challenge, 56 J.L. & 
ECON. 127, 157 (2013) (“[W]e find significant negative abnormal returns for companies that 
were most vulnerable to shareholder access on October 4, 2010, when the SEC unexpectedly 
delayed proxy access for U.S. public companies. We find directionally similar, but slightly 
smaller, results for July 22, 2011, when the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the Business 
Roundtable.”). 
 108.  Recent Case Commentary, Administrative Law–Corporate Governance Regulation–
D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and Capricious for Inadequate Economic 
Analysis–Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1088, 
1092 (2012) (“In Business Roundtable, the D.C. Circuit waded into a political fight under the 
guise of dispassionate scientific oversight to vacate a proxy access rule produced after years of 
open, contentious debate.”). 
 109.  Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for Sec Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 
YALE J. ON REG. 289, 342 (2013) (“The SEC’s economic case will be bolstered by an important 
econometric study conducted in the wake of the litigation itself. Harvard economists used the 
litigation itself as an event study to assess the impact of the rule on stock prices, finding 
statistically significant positive effects from the rule.”). 
 110.  953 F.Supp.2d 5 (D.D.C 2013). 
 111.  Id. at 11. (failing to reach the cost-benefit argument and invalidating the SEC’s rule on 
other grounds); id. at 24–25 (finding that a vacatur of the rule was the appropriate remedy 
because the rule was invalid; no disruption would occur because of a vacatur as issuers had not 
been required to disclose yet under the rule; and the SEC has not proffered an argument against 
a vacatur remedy). 
 112.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., SEC Adopts Rules Requiring Payment 
Disclosures by Resource Extraction Issuers Disclosing Payments by Issuers Engaged in 
Resource Extraction (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/ 
Detail/PressRelease/1365171484028#.UsL75_Mo7cs (“The Securities and Exchange 
Commission today adopted rules mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
TORRES-SPELLISCY 9.22.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/2015  4:35 PM 
2014] RUNNING THE D.C. CIRCUIT 159 
Notably, in API, the D.C. district court held, “[a]s the Supreme Court 
has recognized, ‘no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.’”113 
After the D.C. Circuit held it did not have jurisdiction, the district 
court invalidated the extractive industries reporting requirements.114 
Finally, cost-benefit analysis also arose in the D.C. Circuit’s 
handling of a challenge to the SEC’s Dodd-Frank conflict mineral 
mining disclosure rule,115 which requires listed firms to inform the 
public whether their products contain conflict minerals from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and surrounding countries.116 The 
Court upheld the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis finding that doing a 
thoughtful analysis was particularly challenging in this circumstance: 
An agency is not required “to measure the immeasurable,” and 
need not conduct a “rigorous, quantitative economic analysis” 
unless the statute explicitly directs it to do so. Here, the rule’s 
benefits would occur half-a-world away in the midst of an opaque 
conflict about which little reliable information exists, and concern 
a subject about which the Commission has no particular expertise. 
Even if one could estimate how many lives are saved or rapes 
prevented as a direct result of the final rule, doing so would be 
pointless because the costs of the rule—measured in dollars—
would create an apples-to-bricks comparison.117 
In this case, the D.C. Circuit made a more judicious application of 
cost-benefit analysis requirement, but only time will tell whether the 
more forgiving conflict minerals approach to cost-benefit will become 
the majority rule in the Circuit.118 
 
Consumer Protection Act requiring resource extraction issuers to disclose certain payments 
made to the U.S. government or foreign governments.”).  
 113.  Am. Petrol. Inst., 953 F.Supp.2d at 21–22 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 
522, 525–26 (1987).  
 114.  Id.  The SEC decided not to appeal the decision. Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Won't Appeal 
Ruling vs Disclosing Payments Abroad, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/09/03/us-sec-resource-extraction-dUSBRE9820Z820130903. 
 115.  77 Fed. Reg. 56, 274, 56, 277–78 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 24012p-1, 
249b.400). 
 116.  Nat’l Assoc’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 368–69 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Appellee 
challenged that the Conflict Minerals rule was arbitrary and capricious because the SEC’s cost-
benefit analysis failed to determine whether the rule would achieve its intended benefits. Id. at 
369. The court responded, however, that these benefits were largely qualitative and 
immeasurable and that the agency was not required do the “impossible.” Id. at 370 (quoting Inv. 
Co. Inst. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 720 F.3d 379 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Despite data 
that did not lend itself to a CBA, the court nevertheless found the SEC’s analysis valid because 
it was the best that could be expected and the SEC was required to promulgate the rule. Id. at 
369–70. 
 117.  Id. at 369 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 118.  Matthew C. Baltay, Dean F. Hanley, & Paul Bork, Federal Appeals Court Largely 
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B. APA’s Arbitrary and Capricious Standard in the D.C. Circuit 
As a separate issue, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
allows a cause of action when any promulgated rule is “arbitrary and 
capricious.”119 The Supreme Court has provided some guidance about 
what constitutes arbitrary or capricious rulemaking.120 According to 
the Supreme Court’s Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile, to defeat an arbitrary and capricious 
challenge, the agency must show that its reasoning in adopting a rule 
indicated a “rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.”121 
The D.C. Circuit applies the APA when analyzing the suitability of 
rules and regulations from federal administrative agencies.122 As the 
Court recently explained, “[w]e review the analysis under the 
statutory standard set by the Administrative Procedure Act . . . . The 
APA requires the court to set aside agency action that is ‘arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law[.]”123 
In 2010 in American Equity Investment Life Ins. Co. v. SEC,124 the 
D.C. Circuit applied this standard in vacating SEC rule 151A, which 
would have regulated indexed annuities as securities rather than 
insurance products, holding that the SEC’s consideration of the rule’s 
promotion of efficiency, capital formation, and competition was 
inadequate.125 Specifically, the SEC argued that this rule would 
increase competition and efficiency by introducing “clarity” in an 
“uncertain area of law.”126 But the court noted this could be said for 
 
Upholds Conflict Minerals Rules, Mondaq (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/309960/Securities/Federal+Appeals+Court+Largely+Up
holds+Conflict+Minerals+Rules (“[T]he Court . . . decided that the SEC had acted 
appropriately under the Administrative Procedures Act in enacting the Rules and that it was 
not required to conduct a more detailed cost-benefit analysis than it did.”). 
 119.  5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (West 2014). 
 120.  See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mnfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (“The scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard is narrow and a 
court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must 
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 
‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 9, at 25.  
 123.  Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations 
omitted).  
 124.  613 F.3d 166, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 125.  Id. at 178. 
 126.  Id.  
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any rule adopted by the SEC, and the reasons given for adopting this 
particular rule were no better than adopting any other rule.127 
The court held that this defect rendered the SEC’s purported 
considerations of other components of the analysis similarly flawed: 
“[T]he SEC’s flawed efficiency analysis also renders its capital 
formation analysis arbitrary and capricious. The SEC’s conclusion that 
rule 151A would promote capital formation was based significantly 
on the flawed presumption that the enhanced investor protections 
under rule 151A would increase market efficiency.”128 
So whether it is the cost-benefit analysis or the APA’s arbitrary 
and capricious standard, the SEC must navigate a potential minefield 
of judicial objections to new rules in the D.C. Circuit. To the extent 
that the D.C. Circuit’s hostility is motivated by an assumption that 
markets are “burdened” by every type of regulation, our data sets 
provide empirical evidence to the contrary. 
IV.  OUR DATASETS 
Corporations’ ability to spend in politics post-Citizens United 
raises a host of potential corporate governance problems. Because 
there is no SEC rule requiring disclosure of such spending to 
shareholders, and because a new rule would likely be reviewed by a 
hostile D.C. Circuit, there is a clear need for concrete data on the 
overall effects of disclosure requirements.129 
Our data help illuminate who has the stronger argument in the 
broader debate over whether disclosure, and other securities 
regulations, are beneficial to markets. Since there is no present SEC 
political disclosure rule, we could not measure direct future 
compliance costs.130 Instead, we gauged the market’s reaction to other 
 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id. at 179. 
 129.  James Kwak, Corporate Law Constraints on Political Spending, 18 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 251, 253 (2013) (“Governance of corporate political activity has become particularly 
salient since the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, which . . . made possible unlimited corporate contributions to ‘independent 
expenditure committees’ that do not contribute to or coordinate their activities with political 
candidates.”); Stephen A. Yoder, Legislative Intervention in Corporate Governance Is Not A 
Necessary Response to Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 29 J.L. & COM. 1, 10 
(2010) (“Citizens United itself involved a narrower definition of corporate governance; the 
relationship between a corporation and its shareholders. Specifically, the case raises the issues 
of whether shareholders should have a say in how their corporations spend corporate funds in 
the political process . . . .”). 
 130.  Disclosure Comm. Petition, supra note 5, at 7–8. 
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analogous securities regulations. Specifically, we offer our analysis of 
the market’s reaction to two divergent approaches to regulation:131 
one that increased the regulation of listed companies, SOX, and one 
that reduced certain regulation of smaller listed companies, the JOBS 
Act.132 Through careful examination, our data reinforce the notion 
that the market values transparency. 
This analysis contributes to the debate in two respects. First, using 
the stock market as a central place for market participants to 
exchange and aggregate information, we demonstrate what investors 
collectively perceive to be the net benefits (orcosts) of enhanced (or 
reduced) disclosure requirements. A net positive indicates that the 
market welcomes the news of the new rules by assigning higher values 
to the securities affected, after considering the costs of 
implementation. Second, we believe that market efficiency, defined by 
Fama and others133 as how quickly the market incorporates the arrival 
of new information, or by Tobin134 as how efficiently the market 
 
 131.  The SEC has used the event analysis technique to detect security frauds. See Mark 
Mitchell & Jeffry Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases: 
Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 BUS. LAW. 545, 572 (1994). 
 132.  Christopher C. Paci, et al., JOBS Act Passes Congress, Heads to White House for 
Signature, DLA PIPER (Mar. 28 2012) [hereinafter Paci, JOBS Act], http://www.dlapiper.com/ 
jobs-act-passes-congress-heads-to-white-house-for-signature/ (“The JOBS Act represents what 
is likely the most fundamental set of changes to the federal securities laws since the corporate 
governance reforms ushered in by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act nearly a decade ago after the 
accounting scandals at Enron, Worldcom and other companies.”). 
 133.  See Leighton Vaughan Williams, Information Efficiency in Financial Markets, in 
INFORMATION EFFICIENCY IN FINANCIAL AND BETTING MARKETS 5 (Leighton Vaughan 
Williams ed., 2005) (“The concept of information efficiency in a market is contained in the so-
called ‘efficient markets hypothesis,’ a standard definition of which . . . [is] ‘the simple statement 
that security prices fully reflect all available information.’”); Leighton Vaughan Williams, 
Information Efficiency in Betting Markets: A Survey, 51 BULLETIN ECON. RES. 1, 1 (1999); 
Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34, 36 (1965); Eugene F. Fama 
et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT’L ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1969); 
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 
383, 383 (1970); Arthur J. Keown & John M. Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider 
Trading Activity, 36 J. FIN. 855, 856 (1981) (“The strong-form efficient market hypothesis states 
that all relevant information both public and private, is reflected in a security’s market price.”). 
 134.  See generally ANDREW W. LO, MARKET EFFICIENCY: STOCK MARKET BEHAVIOR IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE, vols. I & II, (1997); James Tobin, Sterling Prof. of Econ., Yale Univ., 
On the Efficiency of the Financial System, Fred Hirsch Memorial Lecture (May 15, 1984), in 153 
LLOYDS BANK REV. (1984) at 2 (articulating three definitions of “market efficiency”: “first, a 
market is 'efficient' if it is on average impossible to gain from trading on the basis of generally 
available public information; . . . [a] second and deeper meaning is the following: a market in a 
financial asset is efficient if its valuations reflect accurately the future payments to which the 
asset gives title;” and “[t]hird, a system of financial markets is efficient if it enables economic 
agents to insure for themselves deliveries of goods and services in all future contingencies, 
either by surrendering some of their own resources now or by contracting to deliver them in 
specified future contingencies”). 
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allocates more capital to productive firms (away from unproductive 
ones), rests on the availability of information to broad participants in 
the stock markets and the quality, especially the trustworthiness, of 
the information.135 Information that can only be obtained by a 
selected few, or information that is incomplete or murky, on the other 
hand, compromises the price discovery and adjustment process, and 
hurts market efficiency.136 
A. Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 
1. SOX Background and Data 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the U.S. securities markets 
suffered from a fundamental, well-neigh existential, problem—a loss 
of investor trust.137 Major companies were going bankrupt 
simultaneously, and the problem was rooted in basic accounting 
flaws.138 If a shareholder in a major company, for example, the energy 
giant Enron, could not trust the financial statements prepared by it 
and its “Big Four” accounting firm Arthur Andersen,139 then who 
 
 135.  BRENT A. OLSON, 2 PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS: GOVERNANCE & REG. § 
14:10 (3d ed. 2014) (“An efficient market is one in which prices reflect available information. 
The Third Circuit has defined an ‘efficient’ market as one where ‘information important to 
reasonable investors . . . is immediately incorporated into stock prices.’” (quoting In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Lit., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997))). 
 136.  Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L. 
REV. 745, 798 (2013) (“[L]ess efficient disclosure leads to less efficient stock prices, which in 
turn leads to less efficient capital allocation. The bottom line is that disappearing disclosure may 
result in less valuable companies and a less valuable economy.”); Fangliang Huang, Price 
Discovery, Competition and Market Mechanism Design, 4 ASIAN SOC. SCI., 126 (2008) (“The ill 
transfer of information or asymmetry of information will affect the formation of prices. The 
uninformed or ill-informed manufacturers or consumers will possibly form mistaken valuation 
of goods, which will harm the price discovery efficiency. The distorted price signal will probably 
cause incorrectly the tendency of production or consumption. Incomplete information may lead 
to two other phenomena, adverse selection and moral hazard, which will make the market less 
efficient.”). 
 137.  Elisabeth Bauman, Not Business as Usual, THE NEWS HOUR (Jan. 30, 2002), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-june02/enron.html (“The collapse has made 
many Americans lose confidence in the stock market. If such a ‘successful’ company abuses the 
trust of investors, what's to say other companies aren't doing the same thing?”). 
 138.  Allison Fass, One Year Later, The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, FORBES (July 22, 2003), 
http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/22/cz_af_0722sarbanes.html (“Sarbanes-Oxley was precipitated 
by a slew of corporate scandals, including those at Enron, Arthur Andersen, Tyco, Global 
Crossing and WorldCom.”).  
 139.  The particular failures demonstrated by the actions of Enron and Arthur Andersen are 
explained well by Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and 
the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 329, 355 (2003) (“Sarbanes-Oxley was a measured and appropriate response to the abject 
failures in U.S. corporate governance . . . . [T]he corporate governance crisis in America, with 
Enron as its poster child, represents a failure of both our system of mandatory rules, and of the 
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could the investing public trust?140 Failures in corporate governance 
were at the heart of these corporate scandals.141 Congress worked 
quickly to pass The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act, otherwise known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 
in July 2002 to reassure the markets that it was safe for investors to 
trust the stock market again.142 SOX was subject to a constitutional 
challenge based on the structure of one oversight board—which was 
found to be constitutionally flawed—but was otherwise left intact by 
the federal courts.143 
SOX was a multi-dimensional piece of legislation that included 
reforms in corporate governance, accounting regulations, and SEC 
reporting.144 Sections 302 and 906 were particularly noteworthy, which 
 
contracting processes, which, together, constitute the infrastructure of the U.S. corporate 
governance system.”). 
 140.  R. Preston McAfee, The Real Lesson of Enron’s Implosion: Market Makers are In the 
Trust Business, 1 THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE no. 2, art. 3, at ii, (2004) available at 
http://www.ovc.edu/advance/hamm/EnronImplosion.pdf (“How did Enron, a •rm worth $60 
billion, collapse . . . ? Market makers like Enron and Ebay are in the ‘trust’ business, just as 
banks and insurance companies are. Once trust was lost, the rest of Enron’s value quickly 
disappeared.”). 
 141.  See, e.g., PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON GOV’T. AFFAIRS 
OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON’S 
COLLAPSE, 107TH CONG., S. REP.  NO. 107-70 (Comm. Print 2002), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT80393/pdf/CPRT-107SPRT80393.pdf. 
 142.  Representative Michael Oxley, one of the Sponsors of SOX, gave this description of 
the climate surrounding its passage: 
Sarbanes-Oxley was passed during a period in which a majority of Americans had lost 
faith in the pillars of corporate life: company executives, public accountants, 
investment bankers, stock and bond analysts, and attorneys. This mistrust, I would 
point out, was well founded. Too many failed to act ethically. Indeed, we have learned 
that many violated criminal laws . . . . 
Sarbanes-Oxley: Two Years of Market and Investor Recovery, Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Serv’s., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Rep. Michael G. Oxley) available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba96550.000/hba96550_0f.htm). SOX is not 
without its critics. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005) (“In the frantic political environment in 
which SOX was enacted, legislators adopted proposals of policy entrepreneurs with neither 
careful consideration nor assimilation of the literature at odds with the policy prescriptions.”).  
 143.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3143 (2010) 
(“Petitioners argued that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act contravened the separation of powers by 
conferring executive power on Board members without subjecting them to Presidential 
control.”). 
 144.  Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley As Quack Corporate 
Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1909 (2007) (“[T]he 
strongest empirical evidence supports the conclusion that the executive certification 
requirements . . . have provided the capital markets with useful information that has already 
improved their efficiency as allocators of capital and should provide increasing benefits in the 
future.”); Michael W. Peregrine, Another View: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Legacy of Enron, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 25, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com 
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required chief executive officers and chief financial officers to 
personally certify the accuracy of the firm’s financial statements, 
where failure to comply subjects corporate officers to civil or criminal 
penalties.145 
Additionally, SOX section 404 tried to rebuild public trust by 
strengthening the internal controls that underpin the accuracy and 
reliability of published financial statements.146 Section 404 sought to 
ensure the reliability of the financial reporting process by requiring 
every public company that files annual reports with the SEC to report 
on management’s responsibilities to establish and maintain adequate 
internal controls over the company financial reporting process, as well 
as management’s assessment of the effectiveness of those controls.147 
At the same time, section 404 required registered public accountants 
to attest to those statements.148 SOX also created the Public 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),149 which can require external 
auditors to conduct a report on management’s assessment, as well as 
on the effectiveness of a company’s controls.150 
 
/2011/11/25/another-view-sarbanes-oxley-and-the-legacy-of-enron/?_r=0 (noting that SOX 
included: “the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, improving corporate financial 
disclosure, establishing new criminal penalties related to obstruction of justice and addressing 
conflicts of interest of securities analysts, among other provisions.”). 
 145.  Final Rule: Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and 
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 70 Fed. Reg. 11,527, 11,528–29 
(Mar. 8, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, & 249). 
 146.  KPMG, SARBANES OXLEY SECTION 404: SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS FROM 
SUBMISSIONS TO THE SEC 2 (2005), available at http://www.kpmg.com.cn/en/virtual_library/ 
Risk_advisory_services/SarbanesOxley_SEC.pdf (“Section 404 of [SOX] . . . requires companies 
that file annual reports with the SEC to report on management’s responsibilities to establish and 
maintain adequate internal control over the company’s financial reporting process, as well as 
management’s assessment of the effectiveness of those controls.”); see also PROVITIVI, SM., 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT EXECUTIVE 
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 3 (2002), available at http://www.protiviti.com/en-
US/Documents/Resource-Guides/SarbanesOxleyFAQs.pdf.  
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Am. Inst. of CPAs, 
http://www.aicpa.org/advocacy/issues/pages/section404bofsox.aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2014) 
(“Section 404(b) requires a publicly-held company’s auditor to attest to, and report on, 
management’s assessment of its internal controls.”). 
 149.  Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010) 
(“After a series of celebrated accounting debacles . . . the Act introduced tighter regulation of 
the accounting industry under a new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. . . . 
Congress created the Board as a private ‘nonprofit corporation,’ [that can] recruit its members 
and employees from the private sector by paying salaries far above the standard Government 
pay scale.”). 
 150.  PUBLIC CO. ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., About the PCAOB, http://pcaobus.org/ 
About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2013) (“[SOX] which created the PCAOB, 
required that auditors of U.S. public companies be subject to external and independent 
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The primary new cost attributable to SOX was that of section 404 
audits.151 Table 1 reports audit fees per million dollars of revenue from 
2002 to 2011, and the year-over-year percentage change, as calculated 
by Audit Analytics, a firm specializing in audit data collections, 
dissemination, and analysis. In 2004, the first year section 404 was 
implemented, the data shows an increase of nearly 50 percent in audit 
fees.152 After the initial increase, the percentages trend downward in 
2006, 2007, and 2008, with an uptick in 2009 (possibly because of 
reduced revenue, denominator, in 2009 rather than a increased 
numerator), followed by a downward trend through 2010 and 2011.153 
 
Table 1: Audit Fees (USD) Per Million Dollars in Revenue with Audit Fees 
over Revenue Percentage Change from Year to Year (2002–2011)154 
 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Fees/$1m $370 $405 $590 $597 $579 
Change — 9.47% 47.29% 0.09% -2.99% 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Fees/$1m $538 $533 $577 $505 $466 
Change -7.13% -0.93% 8.41% -12.52% -7.75% 
 
oversight for the first time in history. Previously, the profession was self-regulated.”).  
 151.  Susan W. Eldridge & Burch T. Kealey, SOX Costs: Auditor Attestation under Section 
4042, COMPLIANCE WEEK (June 13, 2005), www.complianceweek.com/s/documents/ 
OMAHAREPORT.doc.  
 152.  See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 61 (2002) (“The substantial existing 
regulatory framework was breached by aggressive outsiders who seemed determined to ignore 
the risks of their actions, including their personal exposure to punishment. Promoting more 
independent monitors with lower-powered incentives to scrutinize the actions of highly 
informed and motivated insiders cannot solve this problem.”).  
 153.  S&P Capital IQ, Compustat Financials, MCGRAW HILL FIN., 
https://www.capitaliq.com/home/what-we-offer/information-you-need/financials-
valuation/compustat-financials.aspx (last visited July 9, 2014) (“Academic and quantitative 
researchers, hedge funds, and investment professionals around the world use Compustat’s 
unrivaled historical fundamental and market data for in-depth historical research and 
analysis.”). For the universe of companies covered by the Compustat database, the most 
comprehensive financial database on the publicly traded companies in the U.S., the average firm 
saw its revenue decline by 6.39 percent and the median, by 9.96 percent.  
 154.  Don Whalen & Mark Cheffers, Audit Fees and Non-audit Fees, A Ten Year Trend, 
AUDIT ANALYTICS 11 (2012) (on file with author) (defining audit fees as those related to 
“perform the audit or review in accordance with the GAAS [Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards, developed by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board of the U.S.],” but 
could also include fees related to providing “comfort letters, statutory audits, attest services, 
consents and assistance with and review of documents filed with the SEC”). 
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2002 6,259 8,314 0.08% 3,073 3,186 1.23 1.27 2.86 1.00 
2003 6,368 9,246 0.07% 3,742 2,626 1.49 1.05 2.74 0.98 
2004 8,533 10,498 0.08% 6,258 2,276 2.50 0.91 3.26 1.16 
2005 8,851 11,732 0.08% 7,000 1,851 2.79 0.74 3.48 1.16 
2006 9,438 13,152 0.07% 7,612 1,826 3.04 0.73 3.44 1.24 
2007 9,846 14,611 0.07% 7,854 1,991 3.13 0.79 3.55 1.19 
2008 10,121 15,309 0.07% 8,153 1,968 3.25 0.79 3.51 1.18 
2009 9,588 13,485 0.07% 7,785 1,803 3.11 0.72 3.37 1.17 
2010 9,626 15,141 0.06% 7,647 1,980 3.05 0.79 4.26 1.14 
2011 9,936 16,919 0.06% 7,883 2,054 3.14 0.82 — — 
 
 To put the SOX audit numbers in perspective, we compared the 
costs of audits to the cost of CEO or CFO compensation in Table 2. 
Total compensation of the CEOs and CFOs were obtained from the 
Compustat-Executive Comp database including salary, bonus, total 
values of restricted stock grants and option grants, and the payout of 
long-term incentive plans. The median of total CEO or CFO 
compensation was then calculated based on the sample of S&P 1500 
firms. 
In a separate study conducted in 2009, the SEC tallied the total 
cost of SOX 404 compliance by surveying firms about the shares of 
audit and non-audit fees directly attributable to the compliance rule, 
adding in internal labor hours and non-labor costs, as well as outside 
vendor costs.156 As opposed to scaling by total revenue in the Audit 
Analytic study cited earlier, the SEC’s report showed that, scaled by 
total assets, small firms, those with a public share float from $50 
million to $150 million, experienced on average, a cost of 0.79 percent 
of total assets, whereas the cost for large firms, those with over $700 
million of public float, was 0.14 percent.157 In addition, the SEC’s 
 
 155.  Samples include the 2,507 accelerated filers for audit and no-audit fees, and S&P 1500 
companies for CEO and CFO compensation figures. Both samples represent the largest publicly 
traded companies in the U.S. capital markets and significantly overlap. 
 156.  See SEC. & EXCH. COMM. OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, STUDY OF THE SARBANES-
OXLEY ACT OF 2002 SECTION 404 INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS 42 (2009) [hereinafter SEC, SOX STUDY], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox-404_study.pdf.  
 157.  Id. at 53. 
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report found that compliance costs move in an inverse direction to 
years of experience.158 Firms with three years of compliance 
experience see their costs go down to 0.55 percent for small firms, and 
0.11 percent for large firms.159 
2. The Market Reaction to the Adoption of SOX 
The implementation of SOX did not happen in a day; rather, its 
adoption was a multi-stage event, which gave the market a prolonged 
time period to react to the new law.160 Thus we analyzed the adoption 
of SOX as a multi-stage event that took twenty-two days from the 
time the conference committee reported the legislation to both 
houses of Congress on July 24, 2002,161 to when President Bush signed 
the legislation into law on July 30, 2002,162 to the first reporting 
deadline under the new law on August 14, 2002.163 
Investors reacted positively to SOX and other signs that the 
government would step in to discipline perpetrators of corporate 
fraud.164 For example, on June 26, 2002, the day that the SEC 
announced it was filing a lawsuit against WorldCom for financial 
reporting fraud, the average stock market price rose by 3.6 percent.165 
 
 158.  Id. at 41–42; see also Townsend, supra note 21, at 904 (“These costs [of audit 
compliance] have decreased largely because companies became more knowledgeable about 
SOX regulation and more experienced with their internal compliance procedures.”). 
 159.  SEC, SOX STUDY, supra note 156, at 41–42. 
 160.  Joseph A. Castelluccio III, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business: Section 404 and the 
Case for a Small Business Exemption, 71 BROOK L. REV. 429, 451 (2005) (“[SOX was] passed by 
a nearly unanimous vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate only seven 
months after Enron declared bankruptcy. In the same month [that] it was introduced in both 
chambers of Congress, President Bush signed Sarbanes-Oxley into law.”). 
 161.  The joint conference committee of the House and the Senate reported on July 24, 
2002. The bill passed the House on July 25, 2002 and the Senate on the same day. 
 162.  Elisabeth Bumiller, Corporate Conduct: The President; Bush Signs Bills Aimed at 
Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/31/business/ 
corporate-conduct-the-president-bush-signs-bill-aimed-at-fraud-in-corporations.html (“In a sign 
of how profoundly the nation’s business scandals and volatile stock market have rocked his 
administration, President Bush signed a sweeping corporate-fraud bill today with central 
provisions that he opposed just three weeks ago.”). 
 163.  Brian P. Kane, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Something for Everyone to Worry 
About, 45 ADVOC. 16 (2002) (“The first reporting deadline passed on August 14, 2002, and 
virtually 761 publicly held companies filed their certifications.”). 
 164.  UI Researchers Find Positive Market Reaction to Sarbanes-Oxley Act, UNIV. IOWA 
NEWS SERVS. (Feb. 20, 2007), http://news-releases.uiowa.edu/2007/february/022007sox-
reaction.html (“While corporate executives say their businesses are groaning under the weight 
of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, two University of Iowa business professors have 
found that most investors cheered the law during its early days.”). 
 165.  Id. (“Stock prices began to rebound almost as soon as the SEC announced its actions 
on June 26, as stock returns increased by 3.6 percent by the end of the trading day June 27 from 
their lows of the day before.”). 
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Similarly, on July 24, 2002, when investors learned that the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was under review by the House and Senate for approval, 
the market stock value increased by 5.4 percent.166 On July 29, 2002, 
when the SEC stated that it would publicly name CEOs and CFOs 
who did not certify their financial statements, stock prices increased 
by another 5 percent.167 Overall, stocks of companies that investors 
believe were using the most deceitful financial reporting tactics 
rebounded the most after the aforementioned announcements, rising 
on average by an additional 5 percent.168 
Examining the S&P 1500 firms as our data set, we used an event 
study methodology to measure the market reaction surrounding the 
enactment of SOX on July 30, 2002, when it was signed into law.169 We 
used the OLS (Ordinary Least Square) regression model with robust 
standard errors which allowed us control for confounding factors such 
as macroeconomic and industry level shocks as well as specific firm 
characteristics. Expected returns are estimated based on the standard 
market model: Rit = ai + bi * RMt + et. The left hand side is the stock 
return of security i at time t, to be regressed on the return of the 
overall market over the same time period, represented by the market 
index composed of the largest 1,500 publicly traded companies in the 
U.S., with data obtained from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) equally weighted index. The estimated slope 
coefficient, bi, or beta, is then used to estimate the expected return of 
a security using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).170 The 
 
 166.  Id. at 123 n.aa1 (“The stock price effects . . . on July 24, are positive and highly 
significant (Market CAR = 5.4 percent, t = 3.62).”). 
 167.  Id. (“Untabulated results indicate that the positive reaction occurred on July 29, the 
day the SEC announced it would publicly identify CEOs and CFOs who failed to certify their 
firms’ financial reports (July 29 Sample CAR = 5.3 percent, t = 3.40, with 95.3 percent of firms 
having positive returns).”). 
 168.  Morton Pincus, Sonja Rego, & Haidan Li, Market Reaction to Events Surrounding the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Earnings Management, 51 J.L. & ECON. 111, 122 n.aa1 (2008) 
(“We find positive abnormal returns (3.6 percent marketwide) associated with E2, the event 
that spans the opening of trading on June 26 to the close of trading on June 27 and includes the 
SEC’s actions against WorldCom and its mandating of CEO/CFO certifications.”). 
 169.  We did not utilize a difference in difference (DID) analysis because DID is not 
appropriate in analyzing the effects of regulation on different types of firms because the 
assignment of placebo and treatment groups (firms subject to the new disclosure rule or not) 
cannot be randomized. For additional critique on this DID see Marianne Bertrand, 
Esther Duflo, & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences 
Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249 (2004). Moreover, using standard event study methodology 
sidesteps any concern of endogeneity, since the event of federal disclosure laws being passed (or 
repealed) is not considered a direct consequence of a firm’s specific actions. 
 170.  William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under 
Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 429–30 (1964); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and 
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regression also contains an intercept, ai, and a residual term, et. 
Practically, to estimate the model parameters for each company, we 
use a period of 255 days with the last day being the 46th day prior to 
the Act’s enactment date. Such estimates provide a calculation of the 
expected return of a security, which serves as a baseline figure to 
capture the “normal” returns when there is no news. The variables 
that we controlled for in the model are (1) a firm size’s (2) a firm’s 
research and development expenses, (3) a firm’s profitability, (4) a 
firm’s market to book ratio, and (5) a firm’s leverage. In addition, we 
included dummies to control for the different industry types based on 
the firms’ Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC) codes, as 
well as dummies to note whether the firm was a small cap firm as 
defined by Standard and Poors. 
We expect the effect of a surprise, such as the arrival of new 
information about a new disclosure law, to be incorporated in the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), stock returns in excess to the 
expected returns predicted by the market model. Because we are 
interested in both the short term and longer term effects of the 
enactment, we calculate CARs over the (-6,+1) and (-6, +15) event 
windows. The reason behind our choice of windows is that the 
investors knew that the SOX legislation was under review by both 
houses of Congress on July 24, 2002, six days before the event date. In 
addition, the due date for certifications of financial statements by 
CEOs and CFOs at SEC was on August 14, fifteen days after the 
event date. Hence, in order to capture the full effect of market 
reaction surrounding SOX we use the longer windows.171 Consistent 
with previous research on SOX, we found that the S&P 1500 firms on 
average reacted positively towards the enactment of SOX.172 The 
mean (median) of CARs is 3.3 percent (4.7 percent) and 4.6 percent 
(6.7 percent) in the event windows (-6, +1) and (-6, +15) respectively, 
and both means and medians are significantly different from zero at 
 
the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. OF ECON. & 
STAT. 13, 13–14 n.2 (1965). 
 171.  For robustness, we used other alternative windows such as (-6, +14), (-7, +1), (-7, +15), 
(-7, +14), and the results were very similar. 
 172.  E.g., Pincus et al., supra note 168, at 129–30 (“[T]there are significantly positive 
abnormal stock returns associated with subsequent SOX events, including (1) issuance of the 
House-Senate Conference Committee's report, which resolved uncertainty about the act's 
provisions and revealed that they would include the most demanding reforms Congress had 
been considering, and (2) SEC actions signaling rigorous enforcement of the act. These results 
are consistent with investors expecting the provisions and enforcement of SOX to have a net 
beneficial effect.”). 
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the 1 percent level. Note that such returns are in excess to the overall 
market including all stocks traded on the New York and American 
stock exchanges and NASDAQ, and tracked by the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), per definition of cumulative 
abnormal returns. In summary, we found that the market reacted 
positively to the adoption of SOX. 
The effects are highly significant economically. After controlling 
for industry wide factors and firm specific characteristics detailed 
above, we found that for an average firm in the S&P 1500 index with a 
market capitalization of approximately $7.9 billion, shareholders 
received an accumulated elevated valuation of $261 million between 
July 24 and July 31, 2002. The gains ballooned to $364 million if we 
expand the time window to August 14. 
Although the majority of public firms initially opposed the new 
SOX requirements, Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC, said that 
four years after its implementation, companies reported that their 
business processes had improved in terms of risk management, the 
accuracy of financial information and internal and external data 
integration.173 A survey by business consulting firm Protiviti confirms 
Cox’s statement, showing that more than two thirds of large firms 
have achieved significant or moderate improvements in their internal 
control systems—at the same time finding that the cost of compliance 
remained at manageable levels of $1 million or below.174 
Another noteworthy piece of evidence for the effectiveness of 
SOX is the proliferation of similar legislation internationally.175 Four 
 
 173.  Reporting on Internal controls of Small Businesses under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Small Bus. & Entrepreneurship, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (testimony of Christopher Cox, Chair., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n.) [hereinafter Cox Senate 
Testimony], available at https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/ts041807cc.htm; see also 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It 
Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 988 (2003) (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is loud, but not 
deafening—non-trivial, but not more far-reaching than any reforms since FDR. Since it might 
just work, maybe it deserves a B+.”). 
 174.  PROTIVITI INC., BUILDING VALUE IN YOUR SOX COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 1, 8 (2013), 
available at http://www.protiviti.com/en-US/Documents/Surveys/2013-SOX-Compliance-Survey-
Protiviti.pdf. 
 175.  See, e.g., Rachel Beller, Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and West: Can 
It Really Reduce Corporate Fraud and Improve Corporate Governance? A Study of the Successes 
and Failures of Whistleblower Protection Legislation in the US and China, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 
873, 877 (2011) (“Article 43 of China SOX serves a similar purpose as US SOX section 806, 
which is to protect whistleblowers from retaliation and thereby encourage more acts of 
whistleblowing.”); Yuriko Nagano, Japanese Look to Implement ‘J-SOX’ Rules, COMPLIANCE 
WK. (Feb. 21, 2007), http://www.complianceweek.com/article/3100/japanese-look-to-implement-
j-sox-rules (“After two years of wrangling, Japan is finally ready to begin imposing its own 
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years after SOX, SEC Chairman Cox reported that other developed 
markets such as the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Australia, France, 
and Canada adopted similar reforms.176 To a lesser extent, SOX also 
indirectly improved corporate governance in developing markets like 
China and Mexico.177 Investors around the globe cherish more auditor 
independence and improved accuracy of financial reports, where 
management assesses and certifies the financial report’s quality and 
completeness.178 
B.  The JOBS Act 
1. JOBS Act Background and Data 
The motivation for the passage of the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act (or JOBS Act) by Congress was far different from what 
motivated the passage of SOX.179 After the financial collapse in 
2008,180 a long lasting global recession stagnated the U.S. and world 
 
tough set of rules about internal controls over financial reporting, modeled after Sarbanes-
Oxley in the United States.”); Lewis H. Ferguson, Investor Protection through Audit Oversight, 
Speech at California State University 11th Annual SEC Financial Reporting Conference (Sept. 
21, 2012), http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/09212012_FergusonCalState.aspx (“[M]any 
other countries began to adopt independent audit supervisory regimes. Today, just 10 years 
after the creation of the PCAOB, almost all advanced or emerging market countries have an 
independent audit regulator.”). 
 176.  Cox Senate Testimony, supra, note 173. 
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Id.; see also Steven B. Harris, Summary of Activities of the Investor Working Group of 
the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators, presentation at the PCAOB 
International Auditor Regulatory Institute (Nov. 20, 2013), available at 
http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/11202013_Harris.aspx (indicating what investors from 
different parts of the world wanted from audits); Michelle Seth-Langbein & Goh Ee Waye, The 
Value of Audit: Views from Retail (Private) Investors: A Research Project Conducted in 
Collaboration with the Securities Investors Association (Singapore) (SIAS), ASSOC’N OF 
CHARTERED CERT. ACCOUNTANTS (July 2011), http://www2.accaglobal.com/pdfs/international/ 
singapore/VOAPAC (finding that “80% of respondents felt that audited financial statements 
were important to them in making investment decisions”). 
 179.  Compare Bumiller, supra note 162 (quoting President George W. Bush, “[n]o 
boardroom in America is above or beyond the law”) with Mark Landler, Obama Signs Bill to 
Promote Start-Up Investments, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/ 
us/politics/obama-signs-bill-to-ease-investing-in-start-ups.html (quoting President Obama, “For 
the first time, ordinary Americans will be able to go online and invest in entrepreneurs that they 
believe in . . .”).  
 180.  There are many theories about what caused the 2008 crash ranging from pay incentives 
at individual firms to political corruption. See Supplemental Brief of the Comm. for Econ. Dev. 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee at 16, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365230 at *16 (“There is a widespread perception that corporate 
coziness with government officials ‘contributed to the current crisis in the financial system.’”); 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO 
STOP IT 85 (2011), (“[I] find it impossible to believe that our government would have been this 
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economies.181 The unemployment rate in the U.S.182 remained high for 
years after the 2008 financial crash,183 which put enormous pressure on 
American policy makers to facilitate job creation.184 One suggested 
solution to spurring job creation was to lessen regulations of various 
kinds.185 In particular, the election year enactment of the JOBS Act, 
among other changes, reduced certain SEC reporting requirements 
for certain classes of companies and allowed for general solicitations 




stupid had congressmen from both sides of the aisle not been so desperate for the more than $1 
billion in campaign contributions given by individuals and groups affiliated with these firms . . . 
.”); Andrew. C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119, 132 (2010) (“Finally, 
another criticism has recently surfaced in relation to the concerns about risk-taking, particularly 
in the financial sector. Many scholars and policymakers have laid responsibility for the recent 
financial crisis at the doorstep of bankers’ pay structures”). 
 181.  Bulent Gokay, The 2008 World Economic Crisis: Global Shifts and Faultlines, GLOBAL 
RES., (Feb. 15, 2009), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-2008-world-economic-crisis-global-
shifts-and-faultlines/12283 (“The last months of 2008 witnessed what is being called the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression of 1929–30.”). 
 182.  Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject Labor Force Statistics from the Current 
Population Survey Unemployment Rate 16 years and over from 2003 to 2013, BUREAU OF 
LABOR STAT. (July 9, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (showing 
unemployment in the U.S. rising in 2008, peaking in 2009 at 10 percent and remaining over 8 
percent until late 2012).  
 183.  Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, NY REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/ 
2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/?pagination=false (“Five years have 
passed since the onset of what is sometimes called the Great Recession. While the economy has 
slowly improved, there are still millions of Americans leading lives of quiet desperation: without 
jobs, without resources, without hope.”). 
 184.  AMY TRAUB, DAVID CALLAHAN, & TAMARA DRAUT, DEMOS,  MILLIONS TO THE 
MIDDLE 14 BIG IDEAS TO BUILD A STRONG & DIVERSE MIDDLE CLASS 20 (2012), available at 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/MillionsToTheMiddle-DemosFinal_0.pdf 
(“The [2008] recession merely widened the already growing earnings shortfall: during the 
downturn, 60 percent of jobs lost nationwide were middle-income positions, yet most 
employment growth since the official end of the recession has been in low-wage occupations.”). 
 185.  Brian Bodine, The JOBS Act: Reducing the Regulatory Burden on Small Businesses, 
NAT’L CTR. POL’Y ANALYSIS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba776 (“One piece of 
legislation, the Jumpstart Our Business Act (JOBS Act), was recently passed and signed into 
law. It should improve small business access to start-up capital by reducing the burden of some 
federal regulations.”). 
 186.  James E. Bitter & Todd B. Skelton, Reforms for Hire: The JOBS Act Legislation, 14 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 13, 31 (2012) (“Perhaps the broadest overhaul of the IPO 
process for EGCs [companies with annual revenues of less than $1 billion for its most recent 
fiscal year] is effectuated through the JOBS Act’s reduced reporting and disclosure 
requirements. These reduced requirements operate during the EGC's five-year ‘transition 
period.’”). 
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The bipartisan JOBS Act187 was intended to increase capital 
formation, spur the growth of startups and small businesses and 
create more jobs.188 A major component of the Act  reduces the costs 
of going public by providing “emerging growth” companies (ECGs) 
with a temporary reprieve from SEC regulations by phasing in certain 
regulations over a five-year period (including SOX Section 404, 
discussed above).189 Proponents argued that this would allow smaller 
companies to go public sooner, which in turn, could lead to more job 
creation within those companies.190 In addition, the Act allows 
companies offering securities under Regulation D to utilize 
advertisements or solicitations to reach investors and obtain capital;191 
 
 187.  Dina El Boghady, JOBS Act Falls Short on Grand Promises, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 
2013), [hereinafter El Boghady, JOBS Act Falls Short] http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/economy/jobs-act-falls-short-of-grand-promises/2013/03/28/5a660a14-8675-11e2-98a3-
b3db6b9ac586_story.html (“The legislation was built on the premise that regulation constrains 
the growth of small businesses and their potential for explosive job growth—an assertion that 
has been hotly debated by economists for decades”). 
 188.  Whether the JOBS Act has succeeded in creating more jobs is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Other authors have been skeptical. Id. (“Now, nearly a year after its enactment, major 
portions of the act are in limbo, and other parts have failed to measure up to the grandiose job-
creation promises”). 
 189.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 77g(a)(2) (West 2014) (requiring ECGs to provide only two 
years of audited financial statements instead of 3); Lori Schock, Outline of Dodd Frank Act and 
JOBS Act, SEC (Jun. 9, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/ 
1365171490596#.UtrG7LQo7De (“In terms of disclosure, the Act provides for reduced 
requirements for up to five years after the IPO”); James D. Cox, Strengthening Financial 
Reporting: An Essay on Expanding the Auditor’s Opinion Letter, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 
1039–40 (2013) (“In 2012, with the JOBS Act, Congress returned to the topic again and further 
reduced the reach of section 404(b) [of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002]. First, and most 
directly, the JOBS Act lifts the auditor attestation requirements for emerging growth companies 
for five years after going public.”); Townsend, supra note 21, at 895 (“Ten years after SOX’s 
enactment, Congress enacted section 103 of the JOBS Act (“section 103”), which removed SOX 
section 404(b)’s outsider-audit requirement for essentially all companies. Specifically, through 
the JOBS Act, Congress removed SOX section 404(b)’s requirement for 98% of all companies 
that have gone public since 1970.”). 
 190.  El Boghady, JOBS Act Falls Short, supra note 190 (describing SOX as “a grab bag of 
ideas cobbled together for greater impact[]” and noting that “it allows private firms to raise 
money by advertising to the general public for the first time in decades, raise up to $1 million in 
capital from investors via the Internet, and temporarily skirt some of the federal disclosure and 
accounting rules as they go public”). 
 191.  See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub L. 112–106, § 201(a), 126 Stat 306 (2012) 
(to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Susanne Craig & Ben Protess, Wall Street 
Examines Fine Print in a Bill for Start-Ups, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2012 8:43 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/wall-st-examines-fine-print-in-a-new-jobs-bill/ (“[T]he 
JOBS Act appears to loosen financial communication more broadly. For instance, the bill will 
relax rules on how investment firms can market themselves to the public, reversing regulations 
that restrict what hedge funds and private equity firms can say publicly about their investment 
strategy.”); Paci, JOBS Act Passes, supra note 132 (“[T]he JOBS Act effectively overrides [quiet 
period rules] that currently apply to the publication of research reports by underwriters during 
specified time periods after public offerings and during the 30-day period extending from 15 
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The Act also removes SEC restrictions that prevent “crowd funding” 
so entrepreneurs can raise equity capital from a large pool of small 
investors who may or may not be considered “accredited” by the 
SEC;192 Further, the Act makes it easier for small businesses to go 
public by increasing the offering threshold for companies exempted 
from SEC registration from $5 million to $50 million;193 removes 
barriers to capital formation for small companies by raising the 
shareholder registration requirement threshold from 500 to 2,000 
shareholders;194 and last increases the number of shareholders 
permitted to invest in a community bank from 500 to 2,000; arguably 





days prior to and until 15 days after the expiration date of lock-up periods.”); Steven Rattner, A 
Sneaky Way to Deregulate, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 3, 2013), http://opinionator.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2013/03/03/a-sneaky-way-to-deregulate/ (“[Investment funds] will [now] be able to 
advertise—and thereby separate inexpert individuals from their savings. Until now, only a small 
percentage of Americans who qualified to invest this way [those making more than 
$200,000/year or with more than $1 Million in net worth] did so.”); Ruth Simon & Angus Loten, 
Fundraising Rules Murky Despite JOBS Act, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2013 8:15 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304868404579194061455051506 (“The 
new marketing freedoms are part of the [JOBS] Act of 2012. It ended the 80-year-old ‘general 
solicitation’ advertising ban designed to protect investors from get-rich-quick scams, making it 
easier for nascent firms to raise capital to grow.”). 
 192.  15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(a)(6) (West 2014); Lori Schock, Outline of Dodd Frank Act and 
JOBS Act, SEC (Jun. 9, 2012), www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171490596#. 
UtrG7LQo7De (“Companies cannot crowdfund on their own, but will have to engage an 
intermediary that’s registered with the SEC as a broker or funding portal. These intermediaries 
will be required to do some vetting of the company seeking funding.”); Andrew A. Schwartz, 
Keep It Light, Chairman White: SEC Rulemaking under the Crowdfund Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
EN BANC 43, 44 (2013) (“Title III of the JOBS Act, known as the CROWDFUND Act, 
authorizes the ‘crowdfunding’ of securities, defined as raising capital online from many 
investors, each of whom contributes only a small amount.”). 
 193.  § 77c(b). 
 194.  § 78l(g)(1)(A); House Expected to Vote on Package of Capital Formation Bills This 
Week, SMALL BUS. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP COUNCIL (Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://www.sbecouncil.org/2012/03/06/house-expected-to-vote-on-package-of-capital-formation-
bills-this-week/ (“H.R. 2167 removes barriers to capital formation for small companies by 
raising the shareholder registration requirement threshold from 500 to 1,000 shareholders.”).  
 195.  § 78l(g)(1)(B); ERNST & YOUNG LLP, TO THE POINT PERSPECTIVE: THE SEC’S 
OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER DISCLOSURE OVERLOAD, (2012), available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/TothePoint_CC0359_DisclosureOverload_4Octob
er2012/$FILE/TothePoint_CC0359_DisclosureOverload_4October2012.pdf (“The [JOBS Act] 
requires the SEC to review the public registration requirements in Regulation S-K and report to 
Congress on how to make them less burdensome for emerging growth companies (EGCs), 
which have less than $1 billion in annual gross revenues.”).  
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From an accounting point of view, the JOBS Act allows emerging 
companies to follow the SEC’s private company reporting deadlines, 
which often allows a longer time to comply with accounting disclosure 
requirements, rather than those required of public companies.196 
According to Lori Schock, Director of the Office of Investor 
Education and Advocacy for the SEC, an emerging company must 
delineate whether it wants to take advantage of this accounting 
disclosure rule or not.197 While the JOBS Act was welcomed in some 
quarters,198 others worried that the reduced financial disclosures 
allowed by the JOBS Act could cause serious problems.199 
2.  The Market Reaction to the JOBS Act 
We use an event study methodology similar to the one used above 
with SOX to measure the market reaction surrounding the enactment 
of the JOBS Act on April 5, 2012, the day President Obama signed 
this act into law.200 Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were 
 
 196.  § 78g(a)(2).  
 197.  Schock, supra note 189 (explaining that the JOBS Act allows “emerging growth 
companies” to have the same amount of time to comply with accounting standards as private 
companies, rather than the reduced amount of time for compliance generally allowed to public 
companies).  
 198.  Townsend, supra note 21, at 902 (“The supporters of section 103 commonly argue that 
it will increase job creation, reduce the cost of regulatory compliance, and improve the 
competitiveness of the U.S. capital market.”). 
 199.  Benjamin P. Siegel, Title III of The JOBS Act: Using Unsophisticated Wealth To 
Crowdfund Small Business Capital or Fraudsters' Bank Accounts?, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 777, 
797 (2013) (“Crowdfunding requires the use of the general, unsophisticated public to be an 
effective means to raise capital. By requiring less issuer disclosures, as compared with those of 
registered public offerings, the CROWDFUND Act is essentially reducing the transparency of 
crowdfunding issuers.”); Bitter & Skelton, supra note 186 at 31–32 (“A major criticism of the 
JOBS Act is that investors in EGCs [firms with less than $1 billion in annual revenues] will no 
longer be getting an adequate amount of information to enable a comparison with other 
potential investments, and the reduced requirement for providing financial data is a prime 
example.”); Craig & Protess, supra note 191 (“The new legislation passed through Congress 
over the objections of regulators, past and present, who warned of the potential risks to 
investors. ‘It is a bad sequel to a bad movie,” said Eliot Spitzer . . . it should be called the Bring 
Fraud Back to Wall Street Act’”); Cox, supra note 189, at 1046 (“In a regulatory realm of less to 
no paternalism, the touchstone for securities regulation should nonetheless remain the 
information needs of investors. As seen in the case of section 404(b), many nonaccelerated filers 
voluntarily chose to comply with the internal control requirements.”); ROBERT A. FRIEDEL & 
ODIA KAGAN, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, IF THREE’S A CROWD, THOUSANDS ARE . . . AN 
INVESTMENT ROUND? JOBS ACT PRESENTS SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAWS 1 (2012), available at http://www.pepperlaw.com/pdfs/CorpSec032912.pdf 
(“[C]ritics of the act, including the [SEC], state securities regulators, institutional investors and 
investor protection groups, have expressed concern that the JOBS Act will harm investors by 
reducing transparency and investor protection.”); . 
 200.  Landler, supra note 179 (“President Obama . . . signed a bill on Thursday that will roll 
back restrictions on the way start-up companies can raise money from individual investors. Mr. 
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calculated using a CRSP equally weighted index as the market 
portfolio over the one day event window (-1,+1) and five days event 
window (-5, +5). On average, the S&P 1500 companies responded 
negatively towards the enactment of the JOBS act, with a mean 
(median) CARs of -0.1059 percent (-0.0578 percent), and -0.5539 
percent (-0.5105 percent) over the one day and five days event 
respectively. Although the mean and median of the CARs over the 
one day window as well as the mean and median of the CARs over 
the five days window are statistically different from zero, the 
magnitude of those CARs tend to be small. But since the JOBS Act 
was particularly directed towards the small firms,201 we divided the 
mean and median CARs based on the firms’ market capitalization to 
investigate the market reaction of the Small Cap (SMCAP), Medium 
Cap (MIDCAP), and Large Cap (LGCAP) firms around that date. 
Looking at the CARs of those different subsamples, we witnessed that 
the SMCAP firms were the firms that had a significant negative 
market reaction towards the enactment of the JOBS Act. The 
mean/median of CARs around the one day event window, and five 
days event window was -0.3126 percent (-0.2805 percent), and -0.2401 
percent (-1.1732 percent) respectively. All mean and median CARs 
for the SMCAP firms were significantly different from zero at the 1 
percent levels. Furthermore, when we calculate the difference in 
means (using the t-test)202 and difference in medians (using the 
Wilcoxon rank test)203 to compare the difference in means/medians 
between the SMCAP group and the two other groups (MIDCAP and 
LGCAP), we find that the difference in means and medians is 
negative and highly significant across those two groups. Thus, the 
negative market reaction towards the JOBS Act was driven by the 
SMCAP firms, while the MIDCAP and LGCAP firms did not 
significantly react to the JOBS Act. 
In summary, the results of the event analysis indicates that the 
stock market adversely reacted to the news of the signing of JOBS 
Act, indicating that at a minimum, the detrimental effects from lax 
 
Obama . . . said the bill known as the JOBS Act… was a ‘potential game changer’ for fledgling 
businesses in need of financing.”). 
 201.  Townsend, supra note 21, at 896. 
 202.  GRAPHPAD, t test calculator, http://www.graphpad.com/quickcalcs/ttest1.cfm (last 
visited Jul. 9, 2014) (“A t test compares the means of two groups.”). 
 203.  Valerie J. Easton & John H. McColl, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, STATISTICS 
GLOSSARY 1.1, http://www.stats.gla.ac.uk/steps/glossary/nonparametric.html (“The Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks test is designed to test a hypothesis about the location (median) of a population 
distribution.”). 
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disclosure outweighs the benefits of cash savings for small firms. After 
controlling for the same industry wide factors and firm specific 
characteristics detailed above, we found that for a median publicly 
traded small firms with $809 million in market capitalization, 
investors estimated an average one-day of loss of $7.9 million due to 
the enactment of JOBS Act.204 
CONCLUSION 
Again, before the SEC is a pending petition by ten law professors 
asking for more transparency of corporate political spending.205 This 
transparency is needed in light of the hundreds of millions of dollars 
of dark money flowing through the political system at present.206 
When the SEC acts on this petition, they should craft the rule 
mindfully to survive the D.C. Circuit’s review process.207 The data 
provided here may assist the Commission in crafting and justifying 
such a new rule. As explained herein, the issue of the cost-benefit 
analysis is not merely of interest to economists;208 this is a key legal 
question for the SEC as it navigates the D.C. Circuit.209 
We conclude from our datasets on SOX and the JOBS Act that 
there are real benefits for a company that is perceived by the market 
as being transparent with functioning internal controls. We surmise 
that this will be true of transparency about corporate political 
spending as well. However, we will not be able to test that theory until 
the SEC acts to bring transparency to corporate political spending. 
 
 204.  Our conclusions are consistent with a new working paper on the impact of the JOBS 
Act.  Mary E. Barth, Wayne R. Landsman, & Daniel J. Taylor, The JOBS Act and Information 
Uncertainty in IPO Firms (Stanford Univ. Grad. School of Bus. Res. Paper No. 14-16, July 1, 
2014) (manuscript at 24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2465927 (“Taken together, the 
findings indicate that the JOBS Act’s eased disclosure requirements increased information 
uncertainty in IPO firms.”). 
 205.  Disclosure Comm. Petition, supra note 5, at 1.  
 206.  Brief for Walter Dellinger & James Sample as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents’ 
Opposition to Summary Reversal, Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012), 
(No. 11-1179), 2012 WL 1853625. (“Notwithstanding this Court's assurance that disclosure 
would ‘provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and 
elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters . . .  corporations spending 
money to influence candidate elections have predictably denied shareholders and citizens such 
information.”).  
 207.  See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 11, at 701 (“The D.C. Circuit's substitution of its policy 
judgment for that of the SEC both differs from this traditional deference and poses a threat to 
future agency rulemaking efforts . . . .”). 
 208.  See, e.g., Michael Hadani & Douglas A. Schuler, In Search of El Dorado: The Elusive 
Financial Returns on Corporate Political Investments, 34 STRAT. MGMT J. 165 (2012).  
 209.  See, e.g., Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations, supra note 9. 
